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HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS AND THE RELIGIOUS EMPLOYEE
Theresa M Beiner" and John M A. DiPippa'"
I. INTRODUCTION
This article tackles a rarely discussed subject: harassment of religious
employees in the workplace. Curious about the manner in which courts were
addressing such claims, we examined harassment cases under both Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964' and parallel state laws involving religious
employees. What we found was that religious employees are often treated less
favorably than nonreligious employees in the workplace. In this article, we
argue for a "true" application of the totality of the circumstances test that the
courts have adopted for other types of harassment under Title V112 to place
religion on an equal footing with other protected statuses and to assure that the
rights of religious employees are protected fully.
Title VII protects employees from discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, national origin and color.' Religion is also protected under the United
States Constitution's free exercise and establishment clauses. Yet, claims of
religious harassment based on a hostile work environment appear easier to
prove when an employee is seeking to enforce Title VII against an employer
or co-worker motivated by religious beliefs5 than when a religious employee
seeks to invoke the Act's protection against a secular nonreligious employer.
Given the specific protection of religion under the free exercise clause and in
Title VII itself, this result is curious.
As an example, let's examine the case of Christine L. Wilson.6 Wilson,
a devout Roman Catholic, wore a graphic anti-abortion button to work because
she took a vow to be a "living witness" against abortion.7 Wilson's button
caused some commotion at work. As the court explained, "[e]mployees
*. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
Both authors would like to thank Jill Beall, the research assistant who gave up many hours of
her summer vacation to help us with research for this article, and the law library staff at the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. Finally, we would like to thank the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law, which financed this project.
**. Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
2. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (quoting the standard of the
EEOC, set out in 29 C.F.R. §1604.11 (b) (1985)).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
4. U.S. Const. amend. I.
5. This statement is not true for non-secular religious employers, such as churches and
other church-affiliated institutions, which have special protection under Title VII. See infra
notes 85 and 93 and accompanying text.
6. Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
7. Id. at 1338.
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gathered to talk about the button. U.S. West [her employer] identified the
button as a 'time robbing' problem." 8 Indeed, some employees even threatened
to walk off the job because of the button, although this never actually occurred.
Her employer requested that she either (1) wear the button only at her cubicle,
(2) cover the button at work, or (3) wear a different button that was less
graphic.9 Believing this would compromise her ability to be a "living witness,"
Wilson refused. The situation escalated, and some of Wilson's co-workers
complained that her supervisor was guilty of harassment "for not resolving the
button issue to their satisfaction."' 0 Eventually, Wilson was fired for missing
work unexcused for three days after her employer sent her home for wearing
the button. "
Wilson brought a religious discrimination claim under Title VII, arguing
that the three alternatives her employer gave to accommodate her religious
belief were inadequate. The district court held against Wilson, finding that
covering the button while at work was a reasonable accommodation in part
because "Wilson's vow did not require her to be a living witness."' 2 Noting
that "Title VII does not require an employer to allow an employee to impose
his religious views on others,"' 3 the Eighth Circuit upheld Wilson's termination
in the face of her Title VII challenge.
Contrast this with the case of Kimberly Turic.14 Turic became pregnant
while working as a busperson and room service attendant at the defendant's
hotel. Turic discussed with her co-workers the possibility of having an
abortion." After that, "news of plaintiff's consideration of abortion spread like
wildfire, until 10-15 members of the restaurant staff were openly discussing
it.""6 Because the staff was mostly Christian, Turic's consideration of an
abortion caused an "uproar."' 17 Believing that a good deal of this uproar was
caused by discussions initiated by Turic herself, her supervisors asked her to
cease discussing her contemplated abortion at work or they would terminate
her.'" Eventually, the employer fired Turic for not keeping full the comple-
mentary coffee urns in the hotel lobby. Although during her termination
interview Turic raised the abortion controversy as the real basis for her




12. Id. at 1340.
13. Id. at 1342.
14. Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied.
15. Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
16. Id. at 546.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 547.
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termination, her employer denied this and instead stated that her termination
was based on her failure to adequately perform her job."9
Extending the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to this case, both the district
court and court of appeals held that Turic's employer had violated Title VII in
terminating her. While Turic alleged both sex and religious discrimination as
bases for her termination, the court ultimately decided that this was a case of
sex discrimination only. Turic argued that her termination amounted to
religious discrimination, because she was terminated "to protect the religious
sensibilities of the staff," and because her co-workers' "religion was
impermissibly forced upon her., 20 In holding that the employer was guilty of
sex discrimination under Title VII the court reasoned:
[p]laintiff was held accountable, and was penalized, for her colleagues'
reaction to her and her choice. In the context of race or religion, the
illegality of this should be obvious-an African-American or Muslim
employee could not be held responsible for "causing" turmoil which flows
from his or her presence. The same is true of a woman considering
abortion.
Ultimately, I conclude that plaintiff was not fired because she was the
source of gossip (the words, or the conversation itself), but because she
was the source of controversy. Her supervisors and colleagues were not
just reacting to her words, they were reacting to her status. Whether it
shared its employees' prejudices or not, defendant acted on them to
eliminate the person who did not fit in, the person whose mere presence
upset her colleagues. 2'
While the district court did not hold in Turic's favor on her religious discrimi-
nation claim, it ruled against her in part because "plaintiff virtually ignored this
claim in her presentation of proof at trial. 22
The same sort of uproar was created by both plaintiffs in both
cases--controversy concerning abortion-but there was a different result in
each case. Indeed, after examining the result in Wilson, it appears that the
court's comments in Turic were incorrect: a religious'employee can "be held
responsible for 'causing' turmoil which flows from his or her presence." But
should a religious employee be held responsible? How can we account for two
such differing results in two cases dealing with employees who raise a
commotion at the workplace based on their alleged religious beliefs (or lack
thereof)? Perhaps it is the difference in the underlying theory that ultimately
19. Id. at 548.
20. Id. at 551.
21. Id. at 556.




prevailed in the Turic case-sex discrimination as opposed to religious
discrimination as alleged in Wilson. Maybe courts give sex discrimination
cases a higher priority than religious discrimination cases.23 Perhaps it is due
to Turic's employer's failure to invoke the commotion she caused by her
discussion of personal business at work as a basis for her termination. Yet,
Turic's supervisors did note that they believed she had not obeyed their
command to stop talking about the abortion at the time of her termination.
However, unlike the employer in Wilson, this actually was used against the
employer in Turic2
A more likely possibility is the courts' preference for religious claims by
nonreligious employees over those of religious employees. By nonreligious
employees, we refer to those employees who are motivated not by the religious
tenets or beliefs of an organized religion or belief system akin to an organized
religion, but instead are motivated by their lack of an organized religious belief
or reaction to the beliefs of those identified with such a religion. The courts'
preference for the claims of the nonreligious appears in part motivated by the
lack of credibility they accord the beliefs of the religious, especially those
involved in non-mainstream religions. Indeed, the court in Wilson did not
believe that Wilson's religious beliefs mandated her acting as a "living
witness. 25
This article will discuss hostile environment law and the different
approaches the courts have taken to the claims of religious employees versus
those of nonreligious employees. In addition, the article will discuss the
various types of hostile environment claims that are brought by religious
employees. Specifically, three types of fact patterns are described and
assessed. First, we will discuss situations involving employees who request
accommodation in the context of alleged harassment by a religious employee.
This would encompass cases exemplified by that of Christine Wilson--those
involving religious employees who create a commotion at work, harassing co-
workers, and are subjected to an adverse employment action because of it.
Second, we will discuss straightforward religiously hostile environment cases
involving religious epithets and related actions directed at religious employees.
We also will describe and develop a way to adequately address the "pure"
hostile environment case--those involving environments that are not outwardly
23. See Terry Morehead Dworkin and Ellen R. Pierce, Is Religious Harassment "More
Equal?", 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 44 (1995) (arguing that religious entities have tried to gain
an elevated status for religious discrimination cases over sex discrimination cases); David L.
Gregory, Religious Harassment in the Workplace: An Analysis of the EEOC's Proposed
Guidelines, 56 MONT. L. REv. 119 (1995) (arguing that religious discrimination cases should
be given a higher priority because they have first amendment free exercise clause implications).
24. Turic, 849 F. Supp. at 555-56.
25. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1341.
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hostile to religion, but are hostile to a particular employee due to that
employee's religious beliefs. Finally, we will address the First Amendment
implications of these various approaches. Our intent is to develop a way to
adequately address in a coherent manner the particular problems associated
with hostile environments and religious employees.
II. TITLE VII AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based
on race, color, religion, national origin, or sex by qualified employers26 in the
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 27 In terms of religious
discrimination, the Act also requires an employer to "reasonably accommo-
date" an employee's religious practice unless to do so would cause the
employer "undue hardship.
'128
What the term "religion" means for purposes of Title VII is not all that
clear.29 Although Title VII refers to religion as encompassing "all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief,"3 the Supreme Court has
not elaborated on this definition. It has, however, discussed religion in other
contexts. Some courts have adopted the Supreme Court's First Amendment
notion of religion, equating religion with any belief that is "sincere and
meaningful" and "occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that
filled by the orthodox belief in God.",31 Using this definition, courts and the
EEOC have extended Title VII to apply to the rights of atheists as well as other
nonreligious employees.32 For purposes of this article, we acknowledge that
courts have interpreted Title VII to encompass a variety of belief systems.
However, we use the term "religious employee" as described earlier in this
26. It specifically applies to employers of fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(b) (1988).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
29. See Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to
Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 748-53 (1996); Laura S.
Underkuffler, "Discrimination " on the Basis of Religion: An Examination of Attempted Value
Neutrality in Employment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 581, 600-03 (1989).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
3 1. Jamar, supra note 29, at 750. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66
(1965); Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1987); Nottelson v. Smith Steel
Workers, 643 F.2d 445, 454 n.12 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046; Redmond v.
GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n.12 (7th Cir. 1978); Slater v. King Soopers, Inc., 809 F. Supp.
809, 810 (D. Colo. 1992). See also Jamar, supra note 29, at 748-753 (discussing what religion
is for purposes of Title VII).
32. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1985); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d
610, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1988).
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
article not to refer to those who practice no particular religion, but those who
in fact consider themselves part of a religious group.
Religious discrimination cases, like employment discrimination cases
based on other protected statuses, come in a variety of forms, several of which
will not be discussed in depth in this article.33 Plaintiffs bring religious
discrimination claims in the form of disparate treatment claims. In these cases,
the employer has discriminated against an employee in some term, condition
or privilege of employment based on his or her religion. For example, an
employer who fails to promote an employee based on that employee's religious
beliefs has discriminated based on religion in treating a religious employee
differently than other nonreligious employees.34 The disparate impact theory
used in Title VII cases likewise applies to religion cases. 35 Under this theory,
a facially neutral employment practice can be challenged if it has an adverse
impact on a particular group based on religion. Although there are few cases
of this variety involving religion,36 the concept does apply to religion claims.
37
In addition, unlike other forms of discrimination, an employee can sue her
employer for failure to accommodate her religious beliefs. An employee also
33. For a more thorough discussion of the various theories of discrimination applicable
to Title VII in the context of religious discrimination, see Jamar, supra note 29, at 730-45. In
particular, Professor Jamar argues that disparate impact claims are often resolved by
accommodating the employee's religious beliefs. Jamar, supra note 29, at 793-94. For
example, if an employer requires employees to work Saturdays, this will have a disparate impact
on employees who must take Saturday off for religious reasons. By requesting and receiving
an accommodation, the employee's needs are met and the employer will avoid a disparate
impact claim. Jamar, supra note 29, at 793-94.
34. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), is usually cited as the
case setting out the burden shifting analysis needed in a disparate treatment case. Essentially,
it requires that the employee raise a prima facie case of discrimination based on a showing that
(1) he or she is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the position at issue (in the
context of promotions and hiring), (3) did not get the requested position, and (4) the position
remained open or a person from outside the protected class received the position. This test has
different permutations depending on the unlawful employment action at issue. See, e.g., id. at
802 n.13; Hampton v. Conso Prod., 808 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (D.S.C. 1992). After the
employee raises a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Finally, the
employee has the final chance to show that the employer's articulated reasons were actually a
pretext for discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981).
35. Disparate impact was described by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). At least one commentator has questioned the efficacy of disparate impact
in the religious discrimination context. See Jamar, supra note 29, at 746.
36. A search on the WESTLAW legal database revealed only thirteen cases using this
theory in a religion context.
37. See, e.g., Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 88 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996); Mann v.




may sue because he or she is harassed due to his or her religious beliefs.
Harassment is technically a form of disparate treatment, because it entails a
difference in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based on the
employee's religion.38 However, it is a distinct enough theory to be treated
separately for purposes of analysis. This article will deal with the these two
latter situations, for a certain class of cases-4hose involving a religious
employee who is harassed or seeks accommodation in a secular work
environment. Accommodation claims, although theoretically different than
hostile environment claims, are addressed in this article because harassing
incidents can lead up to an employee's request for accommodation or an
adverse employment action against a religious employee.
A. Hostile Environment Law Generally
Discrimination in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
includes employer actions that harass an employee based on a protected
status. 9 There are two forms of harassment actionable under Title VII. The
first is quid pro quo harassment, in which an employer conditions employment
or a term, condition or privilege thereof on an employee's protected status.
40
It is possible to have a quid pro quo claim in the context of religious harass-
ment. For example, a quid pro quo claim would encompass failing to promote
an employee because she refuses to join her employer's religion. However,
these types of claims generally are brought as straightforward disparate
treatment claims, because the employer's actions usually result in some sort of
adverse treatment of the religious employee.4 The second type of harassment
is hostile work environment harassment in which the workplace is permeated
38. Title VII also forbids an employee "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)
(1988). Because harassment is considered discrimination in "terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment," this aspect of Title VII will not be directly addressed in this article. See
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" "evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women."').
39. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 63.
40. In the context of sexual harassment, this refers to conditioning a term, condition, or
privilege of employment on the employee's engaging in sexual conduct with the employer or
its agent. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985). Title VII explicitly defines an employer to include
"any agent of" an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
41. See Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1064 (1989) (employee terminated for disagreeing with employer's religious beliefs).
19971
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with an atmosphere that reflects negatively on a particular group protected
under Title VII.
First recognized in the context of race cases, 2 hostile environment law has
expanded into the areas of harassment based on sex,43 national origin," and
religion.45 The major Supreme Court pronouncements on hostile environment
law have come in the sexual harassment context. In Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson," the Supreme Court explicitly extended hostile environment law to
cases involving sexual harassment. In doing so, it defined the parameters of
hostile environment claims generally. The Court explained that "the phrase
'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent
"'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in
employment." '47 Relying on EEOC Guidelines defining "sexual harassment"
to include .'conduct [that] has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment,"' and two lower court decisions that initially
recognized hostile environment claims, the Court officially extended Title VII
to sexual harassment.49
The Court concluded that harassment need not have an economic
component in order to be actionable. Instead, if the harassment is "sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment,"' the employer has violated Title
VII.50 To decide whether an environment satisfies this standard, the trier of fact
must examine "'the totality of [the] circumstances, such as the nature of the
sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred."' 5
Not every instance of an ethnic, sexual or religious slur is actionable,
42. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972).
43. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1985).
44. See, e.g., Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1130-32 (4th Cir.
1995).
45. See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 15 (S.D. Ohio 1976). The Court in
Compston was the first to recognize a religious harassment claim. See Dworkin and Pierce,
supra note 23, at 49.
46. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
47. Id. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 n.13 (1978)) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971)).
48. Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a)(3) (1985)).
49. Id. at 65-66. Those two cases were Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971),
and Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982).
50. MeritorSav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
51. Id. at 69 (citations omitted).
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however. 2 Instead, the "sufficiently severe or pervasive" language53 has
caused courts to hold that occasional ethnic slurs, for example, are not
actionable as harassment under Title VII.54
In addition, the Supreme Court explained that the alleged harassment also
must be "unwelcome."55 Although the courts often include this as an element
of a racial harassment claim,5 6 commentators have concluded that the
unwelcome nature of the harassment is presumed where it is based on racial
grounds.57 This makes sense; it is hard to imagine a situation in which a person
would welcome harassment based on his or her race. While commentators
have criticized the requirement in the sexual harassment context,58 the
unwelcomeness requirement was apparently designed to distinguish between
acceptable and unacceptable actions and comments in male/female interper-
sonal relations.59
Logically, religious harassment appears to be more akin to racial
harassment insofar as it is difficult to contemplate a situation in which a person
would wish to be harassed based on religion. This assumption works well in
classic types of hostile environment cases, i.e., those in which religious epithets
or other harassing behavior is specifically directed at the plaintiff because of
his or her religion. However, there are situations in which the decision of
whether there is harassment will depend on a welcomeness determination. For
example, if two co-workers engage in a consensual discussion about their
respective religious beliefs on the job, this would not constitute religious
harassment. Indeed, employees should be able to discuss their varying belief
systems without any repercussions. If, however, one of those employees
52. See id. at 67.
53. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1Ilth Cir. 1982)).
54. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
and Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 1996); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 820 (10th
Cir. 1989); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972), quoted with approval in Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
55. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985).
56. See, e.g., Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir. 1991);
Brumback v. Callas Contractors, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 929, 939 (D. Md. 1995); Booth v. North
Carolina Dept. of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 899 F. Supp. 1457, 1463 (E.D.N.C.
1995); Bivins v. Jeffers Vet Supply, 873 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
57. Anne C. Levy, The United States Supreme Court Opinion in Harris v. Forklift
Systems: "Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing," 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 275, 295 n. 149
(1995); Shannon McAuliffe, Note, Speak No Evil: The First Amendment Offers No Protection
for Sexual Harassers, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 233, 242 n.46 (1995); Miranda Oshige, What's
Sex Got To Do With It? 47 STAN. L. REV. 565, 579-80 (1995); Mary F. Radford, By Invitation
Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C.L. REV. 499, 505 n.40,
529 n.187 (1994).
58. See, e.g., Oshige, supra note 57, at 579-80.
59. See MeritorSav. Bank, 474 U.S. at 68-69.
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begins to feel uncomfortable because of what she perceives to be the extreme
nature of her co-worker's pronouncements on issues related to religion, the
situation might rise to the level of harassment. It seems reasonable to require
the offended co-worker to make clear that the discussions have become
unwelcome. Simply requesting the offensive co-worker to stop discussing his
religious beliefs should be sufficient.
In other situations, whether an employee believes the discussion to be
unwelcome will be less clear. The amount and quality of the discourse should
have an effect on analyzing whether a reasonable person would find the
conduct harassing. Does it take repeated exposure to a proselytizing employee
after a request that he or she not do so to form a harassing situation? Does the
employee who feels harassed need to make it clear that such proselytizing
offends his or her religious (or nonreligious) beliefs? A notion of welcomeness
should enter into the hostile environment determination in order to accord the
proselytizing employee's religious beliefs equal weight and the weight they
should be given under Title VII. Indeed, at least one court has acknowledged
and used the concept of welcomeness in the religious harassment context.6"
Exactly how harassment law will work in these situations has yet to be fully
developed by the courts.61
How to determine when to hold the employer liable for acts of harassment
by its workers was left a bit up in the air by the Court in Meritor.. The Court
of Appeals that initially decided that Meritor held the employer strictly liable
for the hostile environment created by the supervisor in that case.62 The
District Court, on the other hand, held that the employer was not liable because
it had no notice of the alleged harassment.63 Eschewing both these standards,
the Court refused to adopt a definite standard in the case of supervisor
harassment.64 Instead, the Court advised courts "to look to agency principles
for guidance in this area., 6' The Court itself acknowledged that agency
principles did not necessarily fit perfectly in every situation. This has resulted
in a variety of standards being adopted in cases involving supervisor harass-
ment,66 although most courts have adopted a "knew or should have known"
standard in cases of co-worker harassment.67 Commentators have argued that
60. Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351, 353-54 (Or. 1995).
61. See generally Gregory, supra note 23, at 135-37 (describing the distinction
commentators have made between various harassing and non-harassing situations).
62. 477 U.S. at 69-70.
63. Id. at 69.
64. Id. at 72.
65. Id.
66. Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions, or Privileges of
Employment Under Title VII? 37 B.C. L. REv. 643, 682-685 (1996)
67. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability for
[Vol. 19
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many courts have adopted what is essentially a "knew or should have known"
standard in the supervisor harassment context as well.6 It is noteworthy that
an effective complaint system can often operate to shield an employer from
liability under Title VII in situations in which the employee refuses to take
advantage of that system69 or in situations in which the employer takes effective
remedial action that ends the harassment after the employee notifies the
employer under such a system. 70
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,71 the Supreme Court further refined the
standard set out in Meritor. Acknowledging that Meritor "takes a middle path
between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring
the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury," 72 the Court reiterated
that whether an environment is hostile in violation of Title VII is determined
by looking at the totality of the circumstances.73 The Court in Harris identified
several specific factors to consider in making this determination: "the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." 74
Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 66,
103-06 (1995) (describing cases involving co-worker harassment); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (d) (1996) (adopting this standard).
68. Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at 132-36; J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in
Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REv. 273, 282-83 (1995).
69. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73 (leaving this possibility open); see, e.g., Kotcher v.
Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring plaintiff to
prove "that the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the
harassment but did nothing about it.").
70. See, e.g., Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1041 (1992) (employer response adequate to avoid liability where harasser was confronted
and fired); Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, 737 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Mo. 1990), aff'd, 985 F.2d 564
(8th Cir. 1991) (asking harasser to stop and moving victim away constituted sufficient remedial
measures to avoid liability).
71. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). Harris has been used to attack a broad range of employment
practices. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994); Marshall v. Nelson Elec., 766 F. Supp. 1018, 1038 (N.D. Okla.
1991); see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972) (stating that this language "evinces a Congressional intention to define discrimination
in the broadest possible terms").
72. Harris, 510U.S. at2l.
73. Id. at 22.
74. Id. Some courts have creatively ignored the totality of the circumstances standard.
For example, in Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., while giving lip service to the standard, the court
went through each individual instance of alleged harassing behavior, discounting them based
on various reasons. 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995). The court never truly looked at them from
the totality of the circumstances and granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor. Id.
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Harris added an additional gloss to the standard set out in Meritor. To
determine if conduct is harassing, the fact finder must look at the situation both
objectively and subjectively:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment--an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive--is beyond Title VII's purview.
Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to
be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the
victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation.75
Lower courts have interpreted this case to require both an objective and
subjective standard of harassment.76 The objective standard entails looking at
whether a reasonable person would find the situation harassing. In the context
of sex discrimination, some courts have used a "reasonable woman" standard
in situations in which the alleged victim was a woman.77
It is unclear whether a "reasonable religious person" standard will be
adopted in the religious discrimination context. Part of the problem is defining
who this person is. Should the factfinder look at it from the perspective of the
average person who is a member of the same religious group as the plaintiff?.78
In its proposed guidelines, the EEOC adopted the perspective of "persons of
the alleged victim's ... religion" to make this determination.?9 This standard
75. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
76. See, e.g., Bums v. MacGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993); Andrews
v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990).
77. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th
Cir. 1987); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D. Me. 1991). For
further discussion of this standard, see Deborah B. Goldberg, Note, The Road to Equality: The
Application of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 2 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 195 (1995); Jeremy D. Pasternak, Comment, Sexual Harassment and Expertise:
The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony in Cases Utilizing the Reasonable Woman
Standard, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 651 (1995); Liesa L. Bernardin, Note, Does the Reasonable
Woman Standard Exist and Does She Have a Place in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
Claims Under Title VIIAfter Harris, 46 FLA. L. REV. 291 (1994); Sharon J. Bittner, Note, The
Reasonable Woman Standard After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: The Debate Rages On, 16
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 127 (1994); Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual
Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion? 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (1993); Kim L. Kim,
The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 81 ILL. B.J. 404 (1993);
Robert S. Adler and Ellen R. Pierce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the
"Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773
(1993); Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman Test in Sexual Harassment Law-- Will It Really
Make a Difference? 26 IND. L. REV. 227 (1993).
78. See infra notes 79 to 81 and accompanying text.
79. Proposed Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National
Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 268-69 (1993). For criticism of this standard,
see Dean J. Schaner and Melissa M. Erlemeier, When Faith and Work Collide: Defining
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would be difficult to apply where an individual had developed their own
unique set of religious beliefs not shared in common with some defined
"group." The standard was never adopted. 0 Another option is using the
perspective of the generally religious person. Using this perspective, Courts
might ask whether a person holding a particular belief would find the conduct
harassing.
The subjective standard is much easier to handle. It requires the plaintiff
to show that he or she actually found the particular environment harassing.8
The subjective standard protects religious minorities more completely, because
of its focus on the particular individual rather than some hypothetical
reasonable person. How these standards interplay with hostile environment
law as developed in the religion context is unclear.
B. How does Religious Discrimination Fit into Title VII?
While many cases and a large amount of scholarly research have been
devoted to the subjects of racial harassment8 2 and sexual harassment8 3 in the
workplace, very few cases and scholars have engaged in discussion about
religious harassment of religious employees.8' This might be in part because
Standards for Religious Harassment in the Workplace, 21 EMPL. REL. L. J. 7, 23 (1995). For
a discussion of the history of these guidelines, see Jamar, supra note 29, at 739-40; Dworkin
& Pierce, supra note 23, at 45-47.
80. See infra notes 389-395 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Burns, 989 F.2d at 965.
82. See, e.g. Stephen L. Carter, Racial Harassment as Discrimination: A Cautious
Endorsement of the Anti-Oppression Principle, 1991 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 13 (1991); Martha
Chamallas, Feminist Construction of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial
Harassment Cases, TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95 (1992); Peter E. Milispaugh, When Self-
Organization Includes Racial Harassment: Must the NLRA Yield to Title VII?, GEO. MASON U.
Civ. RTS. L.J. 1 (1991); Helen J. Moore, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: Racial
Discrimination by Private Actors and Racial Harassment Under Section 1981, 20 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 617 (1990); Todd A. Richardson, Have Victims of Racial Harassment Been
Taken to the Bank, 69 NEB. L. REv. 906 (1990).
83. See, e.g.,CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
(1979); Robert J. Aalberts & Lome Seidman, Seeking A "Safe Harbor: " The Viability of
Summary Judgment in Post-Harris Sexual Harassment Litigation, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 223 (1996);
Barry A. Hartstein, Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie: A Potential "Blueprint" for Sexual
Harassment Litigation, 20 EMPL. REL. L. J. 657 (1995); Barry S. Roberts & Richard A. Mann,
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Primer, 29 AKRON L. REV. 269 (1996); Marren Roy,
Employer Liability in the Wake of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 48 SMU L. REv. 263 (1994).
84. Of course, there are exceptions. See David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of
Religion Through Labor and Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REV. 27 (1992);
Schaner & Erlemeier, supra note 79; Kevin B. Flynn, Religious Harassment Under Title VII:
Incentive for a Religion Free Workplace or a Protection for Religious Liberty, 22 OHIO N.U.
L. REv. 501 (1995). Many have, however, discussed the particular anomalies that are endemic
to religious discrimination, such as exceptions for religious employers. See infra notes 92 and
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there are fewer religious discrimination claims filed. 5 In fact, there are fewer
charges made based on religious harassment than based on any other type of
Title VII protected class.86 One reason for this may be that it simply is more
difficult to make out a claim based on religious harassment (at least in the
context where the employee is religious), than it is based on sex or race.
Already commentators (and to a certain extent the courts) have acknowledged
that it is easier to make out a race claim than it is to make out a sex claim.87
Yet, there is no analytical reason why the two claims should be treated
differently. While some commentators have distinguished religion claims
because they are based on "chosen" beliefs as opposed to innate characteristics
such as race or sex,88 Title VII makes no such distinction. One obvious
distinction, however, is that you generally cannot tell a person's religion by
looking at him or her (unless the person is wearing a symbol of his or her
religion or is in religious clothing), whereas you often can tell a person's race
100 and accompanying text.
85. The EEOC publishes annual reports concerning the number of discrimination charges
filed. There are fewer religious discrimination charges filed than any other type of
discrimination, except for discrimination based on "color," many of which are most likely
encompassed in race cases. EEOC ANN. REP. 17 (1990) (1.8% of charges filed with the EEOC
were 'eligion claims; 46.7 % were race claims; 11.6% were national origin claims; 28.5% were
sex claims; 12.1% were retaliation claims; .8% were color claims); EEOC COMBINED ANN.
REP. 1991 and 1992 29, 31 (1992) (for 1991, 1.8% of charges filed were religion claims, 43.1%
were race claims, 10. 1 % were national origin claims, 12.4% were retaliation claims, 27.3% were
sex claims, and .5% were color claims; for 1992, 1.9% of charges filed were religion claims,
40.3% were race claims, 9.9% national origin claims, 14.4% retaliation claims, 29.8% were sex
claims, and .5% were color claims); EEOC ANN. REP. 1993 22 (1993) (1.6% of charged filed
in 1993 were religion claims, 36% were race claims, 8.4% were national origin claims, 14.4%
were retaliation claims, 27.2% were sex claims, and .5% were color claims); EEOC ANN. REP.
(1994) 36 (1.7 of the charges filed in 1994 were based on religion, 34.8% were based on race,
8.1% were based on national origin, 15.8% were based on retaliation, 28.4% were based on sex,
and .6% were based on "other").
86. For example, in 1990, there were 206 charges of religious harassment, whereas there
were 3,359 charges of racial harassment, 1,403 charges of national origin harassment, and 2,251
charges of sexual harassment. EEOC FISCAL YEAR 1990 REP. 17 (1990). In 1994, there were
365 charges of religious harassment, 4,855 charges of racial harassment, 1,530 charges of
national origin harassment, and 3,978 charges of sexual harassment. EEOC ANN. REP. 36
(1994). The number of harassment claims brought based on religion in fiscal year 1994 were
365 of 1,546 charges made involving 2,504 separate issues of discrimination. There were also
six charges brought alleging exclusion based on religion and fifty-three based on intimidation.
One hundred and forty-eight claims involved requests for accommodation. EEOC ANN. REP.
36(1994).
87. Rachel E. Lutner, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Mores ofAgency
Principles and Respondent Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 589, 621 (1993); Maria M. Carrillo,
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title VII: Reassessment of
Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 41,
81 (1992/1993). See also Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 627 (Keith, J.,
dissenting).
88. Jamar, supra note 29, at 727.
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or sex by looking at the person. This adds a potential defense to religion-based
claims. The employer may claim that it did not know the employee's religion.
This accounts for the burden on employees in accommodation cases to inform
the employer of the religious conflict with work duties.89
Another possible reason for the relative scarcity of religious claims is the
inability of plaintiffs and their lawyers to conceptualize their problems in
religious terms. For example, in Lambert v. Condor Manufacturing Inc., the
plaintiff acknowledged harassment because of his religious beliefs but only
claimed sexual harassment. 90 In addition, the increasing acceptance of
secularization of the workplace may result in fewer employees believing they
have rights that protect their religious beliefs.9 '
Professor David L. Gregory has argued that Title VII and similar
employee-oriented legislation have failed to protect the religious employee
adequately.92 He marks the Supreme Court's development of reasonable
accommodation law in the 1970's as the beginning of what he characterizes as
the "contemporary Supreme Court's debilitation of employees' Title VII
protection against unlawful discrimination on the basis of religion."93 He also
sees the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith94 as further limiting
the rights of religious employees.9 Yet, he does not attempt to make a case
using other theories available under Title VII.
C. Some Insight From Religious Employer Cases
Religious harassment can come from two types of religious employers:
employers who have an official relationship with an organized religion and
employers who do not have an "official" relationship with an organized
religion, but rather, due to the owner's religious beliefs, religion is a subject
that is brought up in some form at work. There are several exceptions to Title
VII that apply to organized religions, such as churches, synagogues, and other
89. See, e.g., Chalmers v. Tulon Co, of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir.,
Dec. 4, 1996).
90. 786 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich. 1991). See infra notes 323 to 327 and accompanying
text.
91. See Underkuffler, supra note 29.
92. Gregory, supra note 23; See Schaner & Erlemeier, supra note 79.
93. Gregory, supra note 23, at 30.
94. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
95. The effects of Smith have arguably been ameliorated by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, which reinstates the compelling governmental interest in cases where a neutral
law affects the practice of an individual's religion. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1988). The
Constitutionality of this Act has been called into question and shortly should be determined by
the Supreme Court. See Flores v. City of Boerne, Tex., 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
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organizations of a religious nature. These exceptions are somewhat controver-
sial, as evidenced by the discussion by commentators regarding their
propriety.96 For purposes of this article, it is interesting to examine the
situation of what Jamar calls the "secular religious employer," or the employer
who, although not a religious group in the traditional sense or affiliated with
such a group, wishes to run a business consistent with certain religious beliefs.
Commentators have already established that there is a difference in cases
involving religious employers. These cases are somewhat analogous; they
involve the clash of claims between differing religious viewpoints, but instead
of a religious employee harassing another employee they involve a religious
employer harassing an employee. In cases involving religious employers in
which the employee is either nonreligious or of a different religion, the courts
are quick to find that the employer has discriminated based on religion.97
These cases are different from employee/employee harassment cases, because
the employer does not have the same rights under Title VII that an employee
does. The employer, however, does have the same First Amendment right to
the free exercise of his or her religion. In this respect, the employer's interests
(if the employer is an individual) are the same as those of the religious
employee.
Thomas Brierton makes an interesting argument that "[t]he courts have
been excessively sensitive to employee accommodations when the employer
is religious and have failed to tolerate the religious employer who believes in
operating his business according to religious values."98  His position is
supported by the views of other commentators." As he explains: "When the
96. Robert J. Araujo, S.J., "The Harvest is Plentiful, But the Laborers Few": Hiring
Practices and Religiously Affiliated Universities, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 713 (1996); Joanne C.
Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to
Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275 (1994); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of
Government to Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious Entities: A Study in Conflicting
Values, 43 EMORY L.J. 1189 (1994); Whitney Ellenby, Divinity vs. Discrimination: Curtailing
the Divine Reach of Church Authority, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 369 (1996); Scott Klundt,
Permitting Religious Employers to Discriminate on the Basis of Religion: Application to For-
Profit Activities, 1988 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 22 (1988); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Religious Educational
Institutions: Limitations and Liabilities under ADEA and Title VII, 89 EDUC. L. REP. 19 (1994);
Duane E. Okamoto, Religious Discrimination and the Exemption for Religious Organizations:
A Basic Values Analysis for the Proper Allocation of Conflicting Rights, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1375 (1987); Karen M. Crupi, Comment, The Relationship Between Title VII and the First
Amendment Religion Clauses: The Unconstitutional Schism of Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, 53 ALB. L. REv. 421 (1989); Scott D. McClure, Note, Religious Preferences
in Employment Decisions: How Far May Religious Organizations Go?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 587
(1990).
97. Thomas D. Brierton, An Unjustified Hostility Toward Religion in the Workplace, 34
CATH. LAW. 289 (1991); Jamar, supra note 29, at 806; Underkuffler, supra note 29, at 588.
98. Brierton, supra note 97, at 290.
99. See, e.g., Jamar, supra note 29, at 804-25; Underkuffler, supra note 29, at 588.
[Vol. 19
THE RELIGIOUS EMPLOYEE
conflict involves a non-religious employer, the courts tend to emphasize the
hardship placed upon the employer, allowing the employer to dictate how the
employee should be accommodated. However, when the conflict involves the
religious employer the courts are excessively sensitive to the employee's
religious needs."" Brierton builds his argument around four cases in which
Title VII or similar state laws were used as a "sword" by nonreligious
employees against their religiously motivated employers.'0 ' Ranging in nature
from an employer who hired based on religious values contained in the Bible'02
to an employer who required a receptionist to answer the phone for the three
days prior to Christmas with the greeting "Merry Christmas,"'0 3 the courts in
the cases Brierton cites held that the employer had discriminated against the
employee based on religion. Brierton argues that such cases have chilled
employer religious freedom in the workplace.' 04 He argues that an expansive
definition of what constitutes "religion" is in part responsible for the use of
Title VII in such a manner.' 5
While Brierton's examples do not involve claims of harassment alone,"0 6
they do suggest a preference for accommodating a nonreligious employee's
beliefs or the beliefs of the employee who disagrees with the beliefs of his or
her religious employer. For example, in Kentucky Comm 'n on Human Rights
v. Lesco Mfg. and Design Co.,'0 7 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held the
employer constructively discharged a receptionist by requiring her to answer
the phone for three days during the Christmas season with the greeting "Merry
100. Brierton, supra note 97, at 294; see also Jamar, supra note 29, at 792-93, 804-818.
101. Brierton, supra note 97, at 294-97; Jamar, supra note 29, at 806-825. Underkuffler
uses three of these cases. See Underkuffler, supra note 29, at 584-87.
102. Brierton, supra note 97 at 295-96; State v. Sports and Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d
844 (Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed for lack ofjuris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
103. Brierton, supra note 97, at 296; Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Lesco Mfg.
and Design Co., 736 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
104. Brierton, supra note 97, at 297.
105. Brierton, supra note 97, at 297-300.
106. By "harassment alone" we mean harassment unaccompanied by other alteration in a
term, condition, or privilege of employment, such as the employee's being fired or demoted.
While some of the behavior in the cases discussed by Brierton could be considered harassment,
all involved some distinct adverse employment action. See Young v. Southwestern Sav. and
Loan Ass'n, 507 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (employee constructively discharged for failure to
attend monthly meeting which began with short religious talk and prayer); Blalock v. Metals
Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985) (employee terminated for disagreeing with
employer's religious advisor), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1064 (1989); State v. Sports and Health
Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985) (employer asked questions regarding church
attendance, reading of Bible, prayer, and belief in God during interview for employment);
Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Lesco Mfg. and Design Co., 736 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1987) (employee fired or quit for refusing to answer phone with "Merry Christmas"
greeting).
107. 736 S.W.2d 361.
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Christmas, Lesco." The employee, who was a Jehovah's Witness, complained
about the requirement and subsequently quit or was fired (this fact was
disputed) because the employer insisted she use it. Yet the fact pattern is not
perfect, from Brierton's perspective, because the employee was a member of
an organized religion that has definite beliefs about Christmas. In this respect,
the case presents a clash between two different sets of religious values rather
than a clash between a religious employer and a nonreligious employee
Looking at this fact pattern from the perspective of an nonreligious
employer and a religious employee, if a fundamentalist Christian employee was
told not to answer the phone with the "Merry Christmas" greeting after being
observed doing so by management, it is doubtful that it would be constructive
discharge when the employee quit because of this admonition.'08 Certainly,
such a request by an employer would not be considered harassment, but instead
a sporadic incident that would not qualify as harassment.' °9 Further, this is not
the type of request that would probably merit accommodation, because it is
likely not fundamental to the plaintiffs religious beliefs or practices.°"0 This
distinguishes our hypothetical fact pattern from Lesco. Therefore, it is likely
the religious employee would not win his or her claim. Just how hostile
environment law is applied in cases of religious employees is the primary focus
of the remainder of this article.
[ll. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT LAW AND THE RELIGIOUS EMPLOYEE
After reviewing the case law involving claims of religious harassment, this
article identifies three categories of claims that involve allegations of a hostile
environment. First we discuss employees who cause a commotion at work
because of their religious beliefs. These claims often involve requests for
accommodation, and therefore we will discuss accommodation law more
thoroughly. Although normally it is the other employees who consider the
conduct of the religious employee "harassing," this category sheds light on the
difficulties that harassment poses in the religion context. Second is an
examination of the most straight-forward type of hostile environment claim:
those involving an employee who has religious epithets directed at him or her
because of religious affiliation or belief. Finally, this section will examine
situations involving "pure" hostile environment cases that do not necessarily
involve a clear intent on the part of the employer to discriminate based on
108. See, e.g., Wilson, 58 F.3d 1337.
109. See, e.g., Koelsch v. Beltone Elec. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1995).
110. In this respect, the plaintiff in Lesco had a more compelling case. The




religion. This includes situations in which an employee feels harassed based
on his or her religious beliefs due to the conduct of coworkers that is not
religious in nature. For example, the posting of sexually explicit material in the
workplace may be harassing to an employee because of his or her religiously
founded belief in the sacredness of marriage. By looking at the various ways
religion-based hostile environment claims manifest themselves in the
workplace, we hope to find a coherent way to approach hostile environment
claims that gives due respect for the rights of religious and nonreligious
employees as well as the needs of their employers.
A. Accommodating Employee's Religious Beliefs and Harassment Law
Unlike other forms of discrimination protected under Title VII,"' religion
is accorded additional protection: an employer must reasonably accommodate
an employee's religious beliefs." 2 This accommodation provision has not
always operated to protect religion, however, but instead has in some instances
curtailed religious practices in the workplace.
It initially is not clear how religious accommodation law might interplay
with issues of religious harassment and religious employees. Indeed, in a later
portion of this article, it is argued that it might not be appropriate in this
context. Nevertheless, requests for accommodation arise in the context of
harassment claims quite frequently, whether the court expressly addresses the
issue or not. Normally, in these cases it is not the religious employee who
argues harassment. Instead, a nonreligious employee trying to stop the
religiously motivated acts of his or her co-worker alleges harassment. '13 For
example, an employee who proselytizes at work because her religion requires
her to do so might cause a nonreligious employee some discomfort on the job,
resulting in a request by that nonreligious employee for either an "accommo-
dation" of her beliefs (although her beliefs might not be traditionally
"religious" in character) or an allegation that she is being harassed by the
religious employee. Her accommodation (or the employer's curbing of the
harassment) would entail curtailing the actions of the proselytizing employee.
When asked to stop, the proselytizing employee might respond with her own
111. The Americans with Disabilities Act likewise requires accommodation of persons
protected by that legislation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9) & 12112(b)(5) (1988).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e(j) (1994). This requirement was added in a 1972 amendment to
Title VII. Specifically, the Act states that "[t]he term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id.
113. This also arises, as was described earlier, in the context of religious secular employers.
See supra notes 96 to 105 and accompanying text.
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request for accommodation. Her request will involve an accommodation that
allows her to proselytize on the job, at least at certain times and in certain
places. 114
This type of counter-accommodation request rarely happens."15 In fact,
we could find no case in which the religious employee actually pled harassment
in this context. This is not surprising. It is not really a case of harassment for
the religious employee, but instead it puts the employer in the position of
having to choose between two employees' religious (or nonreligious) belief
systems in an effort to determine which is entitled to accommodation. In cases
in which the employer takes an adverse action against a religious employee
who refuses to stop his or her religious practices, the claims are characterized
as straightforward disparate treatment claims and sometimes have an accommo-
dation component. A review of the Supreme Court's decision in the accommo-
dation area as well as decisions of lower courts evaluating similar fact patterns
should help determine how the courts and employers can deal with these
difficult situations.
1. Background on Religious Accommodation Law
An employer must accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or
practices unless to do so would cause the employer undue hardship." 6 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "undue hardship" in two prominent
accommodation cases, Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook'' and Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison."' In Hardison, the first of the cases, an
employee of TWA asked not to work on Saturday, because that was his
Sabbath. TWA employees were parties to a collective bargaining agreement
between their union and their employer. That collective bargaining agreement
set up a seniority system that made it difficult to accommodate Hardison's
religion. The particular portion of TWA operations he worked for was open
twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week. His job was "essential and on




Because of Hardison's low position on the seniority list, it became impossible
to find an employee willing to swap shifts with him. Eventually, he was
discharged for refusal to work on Saturdays.'2 After reviewing the legislative
114. See, e.g., Kelly v. Municipal Court, 852 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (plaintiff
permitted to read Bible in non-public areas).
115. See Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1342 (an example of this type of situation).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
117. 479 U.S. 60(1986).
118. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
119. Id. at 68.
120. Id. at 69.
[Vol. 19
THE RELIGIOUS EMPLOYEE
history of the amendment to Title VII that included the accommodation
language and lower courts' opinions in this area, the Court concluded that the
nature of the accommodation obligation had "never been spelled out by
Congress or by EEOC guidelines."'' Therefore, the Court sought to give
meaning to the requirement.
The Court addressed three possible accommodations for Hardison: (1)
allowing Hardison to work four days per week, and have a supervisor from
another department cover his position when necessary; (2) use personnel who
ordinarily would not work on Saturday and offer them overtime pay; or (3)
arrange a swap, which would violate the collective bargaining agreement.1
22
While TWA agreed to the third option, the union refused to authorize a swap
that violated the seniority system set up by the collective bargaining
agreement.2 3 While acknowledging that "neither a collective-bargaining
contract nor a seniority system may be employed to violate the statute [Title
VII]," the Court still concluded that "the duty to accommodate [did not]
require[] TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid
agreement."' 24 The Court based this determination, in part, on the existence of
an express exception in Title VII for bona fide seniority systems.
125
Concluding that TWA had met its obligation to accommodate Hardison
and that all the alternatives suggested would involve an undue hardship to the
company, the Court stated the general rule that governs accommodation cases:
To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship. Like abandonment of the
seniority system, to require TWA to bear additional costs when no such
costs are incurred to give other employees the days off that they want
would involve unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their
religion.126
Thus, when an accommodation results in more than a "de minimis" cost to an
employer, it is not the type of accommodation required under Title VII.
As this quote suggests, throughout its decision the Court emphasized that
accommodating Hardison would involve discrimination against nonreligious
employees.2 7 While the Court did not reach whether the accommodation
provision violated the first amendment, instead holding that TWA had not
discriminated under Title VII, its emphasis on discrimination to nonreligious
121. Id. at 75.
122. Id. at 76, 78-79.
123. Id. at 79.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 81-82.
126. Id. at 84.
127. Id. at 81, 84, 85.
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employees begs the question. If religion is somehow different because it is
protected by the free exercise clause, why not discriminate against nonreligious
employees where Congress has expressly given religious beliefs special status?
By requiring that religion be accommodated under Title VII, wasn't Congress
(and the Constitution) authorizing at least some minimal "discrimination?"
The Court's decision in the next case addressing the accommodation issue
does not shed light on the first amendment implications. In Ansonia Board of
Education v. Philbrook, a plaintiff school teacher needed to observe six
religious holidays that fell during the school year.'28 The collective bargaining
agreement that governed his employment provided for three days off for
religious observance. Philbrook requested that the school district give him the
three additional days off by using one of two methods: (1) let him use paid
personal leave that was also provided for under the collective bargaining
agreement or (2) allow him to pay for a substitute, but do not dock his pay for
the missed days. 129 In the past, the district allowed Philbrook to take unpaid
leave.
Refusing to set out what a prima facie case of discrimination would look
like in this context, the Court did quote the Second Circuit's formulation,
which is similar to the prima facie case used in other circuits. 130 In order to
raise a prima facie case in the accommodation context, the employee must
show that: "(1) he or she [the employee] has a bona fide religious belief that
conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the
employer of this belief; [and] (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to
comply with the conflicting employment requirement.' 31 It is noteworthy that
the plaintiff need not be actually penalized for his religious observance, but
instead the threat of discharge or some other adverse employment action is
enough.32 Some claims are brought in the context of constructive discharge
because the employer allegedly refused to offer a reasonable accommodation
to the employee.1
33
128. 479 U.S. 60, 62-63 (1986).
129. Id. at 64-65.
130. Id. at 65-66. See also EEOC v. Townley Eng'g and Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5
(9th Cir. 1988); Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984);
Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979); Anderson v. General Dynamics
Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 401 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979)
(all using similar prima facie cases).
131. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting 757 F.2d 476, 481 (1985) ( quoting Turpen v.
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also Jenkins v.
Louisiana, 874 F.2d 992, 995 (5th Cir. 1989) (setting out similar standard).
132. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988);
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 1996 WL 22964, *2-*3 (N. D. I1. 1996).
133. See, e.g., Bums v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 405 (1978); Young v.
Southwest Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F. 2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co.,
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The first of these elements, the bona fide nature of the employee's
religious beliefs, leaves little for the courts to determine. Because this involves
difficult questions about the nature of religious beliefs and practices, the courts
have concluded that they may neither determine what the tenets of a particular
religion are, nor "decide whether a particular practice is or is not required by
the tenets of the religion."' 34 However, this admonition, finding its basis in the
Supreme Court's holding in Fowler v. Rhode Island,'35 does not extend to
determining whether an employee's religious beliefs are sincerely held. This
finding sometimes masquerades as a finding on the nature of the employee's
beliefs. 136
The courts have interpreted the notice element as requiring the employee
to describe the nature of the religious observation and why the particular
employment practice conflicts with their observation. 137 These courts reason
that an employer cannot know how to accommodate an employee's religious
beliefs without knowing the nature of the belief and the conflict. 3 ' In addition,
if the employer is not aware of the conflict, its action in not accommodating the
employee can hardly rise to the level of intentional discrimination that is
envisioned by Title VII.39 Some courts have not required explicit notice, so
long as the employer was "aware of the potential for conflict.""'4 The Ninth
Circuit in particular has detailed the type of notice that is necessary:
A sensible approach would require only enough information about an
employee's religious needs to permit the employer to understand the
existence of a conflict between the employee's religious practices and the
employer's job requirements ....
Any greater notice requirement would permit an employer to delve
into the religious practices of an employee in order to determine whether
religion mandates the employee's adherence. If courts may not make such
an inquiry, then neither should employers. 14'
753 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Miss. 1990).
134. Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Richmond v.
GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1978); see Vetter v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 884 F.
Supp. 1287, 1306 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
135. 345 U.S. 67 (1953). The Court in Fowler stated that "it is no business of courts to say
... what is a religious practice or activity .... " Id. at 70.
136. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1341; see infra notes 158 to 163 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1039 (1978); Cary v. Carmichael, 908 F. Supp. 1334, 1343 (E.D. Va. 1995).
138. Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1344.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
141. Heller, 8 F.3d at 1439 (citations omitted).
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Seizing on language in Philbrook, some courts have carried the notice concept
into an affirmative "duty to cooperate" on the part of the religious employee.'42
Other courts have required the employer to make the first suggestion of an
accommodation before enforcing the employee's duty to cooperate. 143
After the employee raises a prima facie case, courts using this analysis
then shift the burden to the employer to show that it made "good faith efforts
to accommodate [the employee's] religious beliefs and, if those efforts were
unsuccessful, to demonstrate that [the employer was] unable reasonably to
accommodate [the employee's] beliefs without undue hardship."' 44 This
sometimes is translated into a two step analysis, involving determinations as to
(1) whether accommodation is possible and (2) whether the accommodation is
reasonable.'45 An accommodation is not reasonable if it causes undue hardship
to the employer. In the case of an employer who refuses to offer a reasonable
accommodation, the employer "may only prevail if it shows that no
accommodation could have been made without undue hardship."'"
1
The Court in Philbrook directly addressed the issue of whether the
employer must accept an employee's requested accommodation unless the
employer shows undue hardship. 147 Although the Court ultimately remanded
the case for consideration of how, precisely, the various forms of leave were
administered, it concluded that the employer is under no obligation to accept
an employee's proffered accommodation unless it can show that the requested
accommodation would cause an undue hardship. Instead, so long as the
employer gives at least one reasonable accommodation, it meets its burden
under Title VII's accommodation provision. 48 In cases like Philbrook, in
which the employer would arguably violate a collective bargaining agreement
to accommodate the employee's religion, the courts have generally found
undue hardship. 1
49
Commentators have criticized the holding in Philbrook as limiting the
already paltry relief available to employees who seek religious accommodation.
As one commentator has noted:
142. See Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1347; Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146
(5th Cir. 1982).
143. EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., 849 F.2d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1988); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco,
Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1488 (10th Cir. 1989).
144. Anderson, 589 F.2d at 401.
145. See Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1368-70 (8th Cir. 1993); Vetter, 884 F. Supp. at
1308.
146. Toledo, 892 F.2d at 1490, quoted in Cary, 908 F. Supp. 1349.
147. 479 U.S. at 68.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Mann, 7 F.3d at 1369-70; Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1350-53.
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Given the favorable interpretation of "undue hardship" provided to
employers in Hardison, one might logically question the Philbrook Court's
unwillingness to require employers to accept employee proposed accom-
modations unless such employers can show that these formulations would
impose "undue hardships." Such an approach would have provided
workers with a greater degree of religious freedom, and it is doubtful that
such a construction would have created establishment clause difficulties. 5"
In spite of the low level of accommodation required of employers,'5 ' it remains
the standard courts apply today. However, some courts have lessened its
impact by requiring the purported hardship to be concrete, rather than
speculative. Thus, the employer's cost of accommodation "must mean present
undue hardship, as distinguished from anticipated or multiplied hardship.' 5 2
The Supreme Court cases described above involve straightforward issues
of accommodation of a religious employee. The employee needs a day off for
a religious observance, and the employer decides whether or not to grant it,
considering the relevant legal standard. The cases involving the combination
of harassment and accommodation present a much more difficult scenario
where the "de minimis" cost standard quite likely is not always appropriate,
because it often will result in no meaningful accommodation for the religious
employee.
2. Application of Accommodation Law to Religious Employees who
"Harass" Co- workers
Two themes come out of the cases involving employees who engage in
religious activities on the job that annoy or harass co-workers. One is that the
courts are reluctant to give way to the religious employee's practices in the face
150. Charles B. Craver, The 1986-1987 Supreme Court Labor and Employment Law Term:
The Expanding Focus on Individual Rights and Preemption, 3 LAB. LAW. 755, 773 (1987); see
also Gregory, supra note 23 (criticizing both Philbrook and Hardison).
151. Several commentators have argued for a higher standard. See, e.g., Jamar, supra note
29, at 800-801 (arguing that the Americans with Disabilities Act concept of "reasonable
accommodation" may be more appropriate); David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of
Religion Through Labor and Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSoN L. REv. 27 (1992)
(arguing that the undue hardship standard under Title VII is too weak to protect employee's free
exercise rights). Professor Jamar argues that courts should require employers to show that the
accommodation is truly an "undue hardship," "not a mere convenience." Jamar, supra note 29,
at 802.
152. Cook, 981 F.2d at 339 (quoting Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 962
(8th Cir. 1979)); see also Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403,406-07 (9th Cir.




of resulting time robbing. Second, employers are increasingly trying to
secularize the workplace by taking action against religious employees even
before a co-worker complains. This reaction by employers may be easy to
explain; the fear of a claim by a religious employee may be less than the fear
of one by a nonreligious employee. The employer's assessment in this regard
may well be justified; the religious employee has a lesser chance of succeeding
on his or her claim.
One of the more interesting cases involving a conflict between the needs
of a religious employee and her co-workers is the Wilson case, which was
briefly described in the introduction to this article. Wilson was a Roman
Catholic who took a vow to wear an anti-abortion button "until there was an
end to abortion or until [she] could no longer fight the fight."'5 The button
caused a commotion at her workplace, resulting in a purported forty percent
decline in productivity.1 54 Wilson argued that her employer should accommo-
date her religious belief. Her co-workers, on the other hand, alleged that her
wearing of the button amounted to harassment and charged Wilson's boss in
particular with harassing behavior based on his failure to stop Wilson from
doing so. 55 Her employer offered her three accommodations: (1) Wilson
could wear the button in her cubicle; (2) she could wear the button but cover
it while at work; or (3) she could wear a different button that did not have a
photograph of a fetus on it.156 Wilson rejected these accommodations. The
trial court held that Wilson's religious beliefs did not require her to be a living
witness in this manner and further that her employer had offered her a
reasonable accommodation in allowing her to wear the button covered up157
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision. The most
interesting part of its decision is the acceptance of the trial court's decision as
to Wilson's belief that she must be a living witness. The parties had stipulated
that Wilson's beliefs were sincerely held.15 The court, however, reasoned that
this stipulation did not "cover the details of her religious vow."'5 While the
testimony at trial revealed that Wilson did not always mention the living
witness component of her vow in explaining its nature, it is not clear, under the
law, that this should have played any part in the court's decision. The Supreme
Court itself has stated that it is "no business of courts to say ... what is a
religious practice or activity."' 6 In light of this admonition, federal courts do
153. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1339.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1340.
156. Id. at 1339.
157. Id. at 1340.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1341.
160. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953).
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not involve themselves in determinations as to the propriety of a plaintiff's
religious beliefs in this context.16' The courts cannot determine the tenets of a
particular religion or whether a particular religious practice is or is not required
by that religion. 162 Instead, courts may only decide whether an employee
sincerely holds that particular religious belief. Yet, there was a stipulation in
this case that Wilson did sincerely hold this religious belief. Under these
circumstances, there should have been nothing left for the court to determine
as to the particular belief in question. The only issue left would have been
whether the employer's accommodation was adequate under the circumstances
of the case.
In part, the Eighth Circuit seemed to be hemmed in by (or at least relied
upon) the standard of review applied to fact finding: clearly erroneous. It
repeats and alludes to this standard throughout its analysis of the lower court's
decision. 63 Yet, invocation of the standard seems disingenuous. Instead, it
seems like the court does not value Wilson's belief, because it deviates from
what "normal" Roman Catholics would do in her situation. Although the court
obviously does not come right out and say this, it notes certain facts that
suggest this is what it is doing. For example, it notes that Wilson's supervisors
are both Roman Catholics who oppose abortion."6 While this shows that they
are sympathetic to Wilson's position, it also suggests a comparison group of
Catholics who are not as extreme as Wilson as a potential benchmark of
normalcy in this context. This difference from the norm is reflected in the
characterization of Wilson's requested accommodation as requiring her
employer to "allow Wilson to impose her beliefs as she chooses. ' ' 65 That was
not Wilson's position at all; instead she was simply trying to exercise her
religion consistent with her belief system, and, indeed offered several
accommodations of her own that were intended to minimize the commotion her
button caused. The court's analysis reads more like an evaluation of the way
Wilson chooses to exercise her religion. The court is beyond its capabilities in
making this determination and should not have considered the quality of her
belief in deciding her case.
The Eighth Circuit's disdain for Wilson's religious beliefs becomes
clearer in looking at its analysis of the reasonable accommodation aspect of her
claim. Wilson argued that her religious practice was not the cause of disruption
in the workplace, but instead it was her co-workers' reactions that caused the
161. SeeHeller, 8 F.3d at 1438.
162. See id.
163. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1341.
164. Id. at 1339.
165. Id. at 1341.
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problem.'6 In response to this characterization, the court states that "to simply
instruct Wilson's co-workers that they must accept Wilson's insistence on
wearing a particular depiction of a fetus as part of her religious beliefs is
antithetical to the concept of reasonable accommodation."' 167 The court's
analysis might be correct if the other employees opposed Wilson's practice
based on their own religious beliefs. However, there is no evidence to suggest
that, and, indeed the evidence suggests that other employees actually were
sympathetic to her viewpoint, although intolerant to the manner in which she
chose to express it.' 68 This suggests that even reasonable people who hold
Wilson's belief do not choose to act on this belief in such an extreme way.
Once again, the court suggests that Wilson is just out of line. 169 This is the type
of circumstance, however, in which we want the courts to protect a religious
belief. It is no challenge to protect a mainstream religious viewpoint; these
views are rarely challenged. Instead, Title VII and the free exercise clause
itself are designed to protect non-mainstream views.
70
On what basis, then, does a co-worker's discomfort trump another co-
worker's right to exercise their religion on the job? Certainly, the employer's
time robbing concerns must play some part in this analysis. It is obvious that
it was costing Wilson's employer a significant amount in lost productivity.
Wilson suggested three accommodations that were intended to ameliorate the
problem: "(1) instruct Wilson's co-workers to ignore the button; (2) separate
Wilson's work station from her co-workers; or (3) transfer Wilson to another
division.' 171 Because the court determined that one of the employer's proffered
accommodations (the ability to wear the button covered up on the job) was
sufficient, it did not reach the issue of whether Wilson's proposed accommoda-
tions would or would not cause an undue hardship. 172 However, Wilson's
proposed accommodations were appropriate and consistent with Title VII law
generally. Perhaps this is why the court avoided ruling on Wilson's proposals..
The most interesting accommodation requested by Wilson was her request
that co-workers be instructed to ignore the button. While the time robbing
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. The court specifically noted that'many employees who opposed Wilson's button
shared Wilson's religion and view on abortion." Id.
169. This is not to say that the courts should not or cannot find that a particular plaintiff is
out of line. For example, in Dalisay v. Neville Lewis & Assoc., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1246 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1994), the plaintiff alleged that a California-based televangelist was
sending "messages through the air waves encouraging people to violate her civil rights." The
court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
170. This is supported by the legislative history of the amendment that added the
accommodation provision to Title VII. See 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972).




associated with this accommodation might have caused more than a de minimis
burden, the use of such an accommodation would have been consistent with
caselaw developed under Title VII in other contexts. In this respect, the de
minimis burden is at odds With rules developed in the context of other forms
of discrimination under Title VII. For example, in race and sex discrimination
cases, the courts do not permit employers to refuse to hire an employee based
on sex or race for a particular job because of customer preference.'73 This
could have a significant burden on the employer--and clearly more than a de
minimis one. It could result in the loss of valuable customers. Yet, courts have
consistently found such arguments unpersuasive as establishing both business
necessity analyses and bona fide occupational qualification defenses to Title
VI 74  The reason for this is obvious. It would result in permitting an
employer to give effect to the stereotyping and bigotry of its customers as to
who is capable of doing certain jobs.
Some courts have extended this idea to co-worker preferences.'75 The
extension is logical. Anti-discrimination laws are designed, in part, to increase
the employment opportunities of groups that have been segregated in the
workplace. The purposes of anitidiscrimination laws would not be furthered
by allowing continued segregation based on co-worker preference. The court
in Cain v. Hyatt put it well:
To permit an employer to circumvent the dictates of the antidiscrimination
statute by declaring an individual unfit because the prejudices of its
173. Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993) (customer preference
for unbearded men did not rise to the level of a sufficient business justification for no beard
policy that had disparate impact on African-American males); Rucker v. Higher Educ. AIDS
Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77
(9th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. St. Anne's Hosp. of Chicago, 664 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir. 1981);
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airlines, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971)(sex discrimination not a
BFOQ based on customer preference), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a)(iii) (denying BFOQ status in sex discrimination cases in which "[t]he refusal to hire
an individual [is based on] the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or
customers ...").
174. See, e.g., Bradley, 7 F.3d 795; Rucker, 669 F.2d 1179; Fernandez, 653 F.2d 1273, St.
Anne's Hosp., 664 F.2d 128; Diaz, 442 F.2d 385. The business necessity defense is available
in disparate impact cases, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(a). BFOQs are available for all forms of
discrimination except discrimination based on race and color. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
175. See, e.g., Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (quoting Jansen v.
Food Circus Supermarkets, 110 N.J. 363, 373 (1988)) (in the context of AIDS discrimination
under the Americans with Disabilities Act). The lack of case law in this area is most likely due
to the obvious nature of such a claim. If a woman caused a commotion on the job because she
is, for example, the first woman firefighter, the courts certainly would not allow the fire
department tojustify her termination using this type of time-robbing analysis. It has been raised
in the context of AIDS discrimination because of the public misperception of the contagious
nature of the disease, and the resulting argument that such a commotion on the part of co-
workers is somehow justified.
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employees commanded it to do so would be "totally anomalous".., for
the purpose of the Act [in this case, the ADA] is to eradicate the harm that
ubiquitous stereotyping perpetuates.
76
While the analysis in the ADA context is a bit different (focusing instead
on stereotyping as to job capabilities based on disability), the underlying
rationale should also support religious claims. The point of antidiscrimination
laws is to open up employment opportunities for individuals in spite of
differences. Allowing co-workers to stifle the religious beliefs of others (often
resulting in the termination or constructive discharge of the religious employee)
is antithetical to these principles, and results in a burden being placed on
religious employees because of their religion. The outcome of a lawsuit based
on religious discrimination should not depend on the personal preferences of
co-workers anymore than it would on the personal preferences of customers.
The courts burden the employer with time robbing in other Title VII contexts.
Why not in this one?
The obvious response to why religion cases are harder for plaintiffs to
maintain and why the Supreme Court has set the accommodation level at the
de minimis standard is because to do more would violate the Establishment
Clause.'7 7 Unlike other protected classes, religion has this specific constitu-
tional limitation. 7 In this respect, the Establishment Clause is in some tension
with the Free Exercise Clause. The courts-including Justice O'Connor in a
concurring opinion-have already suggested that the accommodation of
religion (at least as currently formulated) in Title VII does not violate the
Establishment Clause. 1
79
Commentators have been debating the interplay of the Free Exercise
Clause, Establishment Clause, and the theory of accommodation of religion for
quite some time now. 8 0 Although the opinions of these commentators range
176. 734 F. Supp. at 681 (citations omitted).
177. It is noteworthy that the Court in Philbrook did not note this as the basis for its
decision, and indeed never even addressed the Establishment Clause. Ansonia Bd. Of Educ.
v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986). Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Hardison, suggested that
something more than a de minimis standard would not violate the Establishment Clause. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178. Although the courts could run into equal protection problems by favoring certain
classes over others.
179. See Thornton v. Caldor Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Protos v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 135 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
972 (1986), and cases cited therein.
180. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743
(1992); William Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 308 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Mark Tushnet, The Emerging
Principle ofAccommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988).
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from strongly in favor of accommodation of religion because it is constitution-
ally mandated,' 8 1 to strongly against it because it is unconstitutional, 8 2 the
debate regarding the extent the courts and Congress can or must require
accommodation of religious practices should not detain us too long here. 1
83
Given that the courts have upheld the constitutionality of religious
accommodations in the Title VII context,' the real question is how far can the
courts go in permitting accommodations. It seems apparent that Congress
meant to go farther than a mere "de minimis" standard. 185 We believe that the
courts could interpret the accommodation requirement more broadly than the
de minimis standard without the accommodation resulting in an unconstitu-
tional establishment of religion. Exactly how far the accommodation
requirement should extend is a difficult question that must be addressed in each
individual context in which an employee requests accommodation. There are,
of course, limitations. If the accommodation of an employee's religious
practices results in harassment of other employees based on these employees'
religious beliefs, the accommodation principle has gone too far. 186 However,
if the accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs results in some initial
time-robbing and associated costs to the employer,8 7 it should not violate the
Constitution. Instead, it is consistent with the courts' interpretations in the
context of other protected statuses to allow for a bit of time robbing in order to
further the principles of equality that underly the statute.
In his analysis of Title VII law and the religious secular employer,'
Steven D. Jamar sets out an approach to employment discrimination law that
seeks to encompass both the rights of religiously motivated employers and their
181. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 180.
182. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation
of Religion under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITr. L. REv. 75 (1990);
Tushnet, supra note 180.
183. An in-depth analysis of this issue is well beyond the scope of this article.
184. See, e.g., Protos v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 972 (1986).
185. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 88-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Indeed, the legislation was
particularly aimed at Sabbatarians. See 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972). Yet, the Supreme Court
has consistently held against their right to have a specific day off for religious observation. See
supra notes 116 to 129 and accompanying text.
186. It is interesting to note that Wilson's co-workers apparently did not claim harassment
any protected status recognized under Title VII. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1339. The employees were
simply offended by Wilson's abortion button. Id. They were not (and the court made pains to
point out) offended because it violated some religious belief of their own or offended them
based on some other protected status. Id. at 1341. There is no general right to be free from
being offended in the workplace. It must be linked to some protected status. In this regard,
their claims of harassment were not encompassed by Title VII.
187. This could result in more than a de minimis cost to the employer.
188. Jamar, supra note 29.
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nonreligious employees. Jamar argues that such cases should not be decided
based on hard and fast "rules," but instead on principles that can be balanced
and influence the outcome of the decision. 9 The principles he suggests using
in the context of a religious secular employer and a nonreligious employee are
accommodation, equality, neutrality, tolerance, and inclusion. His principles
could likewise be applied in the context of a collision between religious
employees and their nonreligious co-workers. Although Jamar proposes that
the courts use his principles to guide their decisions in religious secular
employer cases, the concepts themselves help in understanding how to handle
co-worker tensions based on religion. The concept that applies most vividly
to co-worker disputes is tolerance. If co-workers were tolerant of the religious
beliefs of their fellow workers, we would see less commotion created by what
are considered "extreme" religious viewpoints. In such situations, the reasons
for Christine Wilson's termination would disappear. Her co-workers would
respect her religious belief--even though it might conflict with their own
beliefs or offend them for some other reasor--and allow her to wear her
abortion button without causing a significant disruption.
An example of co-worker tolerance comes out of Smith v. Universal
Services, Inc.'9 In Smith, the plaintiff sang religious hymns on the job.'9 ' He
also discussed tenets of his religion with his co-workers when they raised it. 92
Several co-workers testified that they had heard the plaintiff hum hymns on the
job or discuss his religion on the job, but that it did not bother them.' 93 Instead,
the singing apparently bothered one of his supervisors, who requested that
Smith stop singing and preaching.' 94 Although Smith's termination was
ultimately upheld because he did not perform his job well, the case reflects a
fact pattern of religious tolerance by employees that is truly admirable. It also
reflects the attitude of the employer's supervisor that religion has no place in
the workplace.
The concept of tolerance was discussed obliquely in another Eighth
Circuit accommodation case, Brown v. Polk County, Iowa.'95 The plaintiff in
Brown was a bom-again Christian who was the director of information services
for Polk County, Iowa, and supervised fifty employees. Brown engaged in
certain religiously-oriented activities in the workplace. Specifically, he
conducted prayer sessions at the beginning of the workday with several other
189. Jamar, supra note 29, at 780-789.
190. 454 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972).
191. Id. at 155-6.
192. Smith v. Universal Serv., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. La. 1972).
193. Id. at 443-44.
194. Id. at 444. The supervisor apparently complained that it upset the other men, although
no other men so testified. Id.
195. 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996).
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employees. He quoted Bible passages at a meeting of employees. He also kept
a Bible on the desk in his office.'9 Finally, he allowed prayers in his office
during department meetings and at one time directed a secretary to type some
Bible study notes for him.' 97 In response to these activities, the county
administrator asked Brown to "cease any activities that could be considered to
be religious proselytizing, witnessing, or counseling."' 9' In addition, the
reprimand "directed Mr. Brown to 'insure a work environment that is free of
the types of activities... described.'""9
Given the serious consideration that courts give the claims of nonreligious
employees confronted by secular religious employers,2° it is not all that
surprising that, in an abundance of caution, an employer might have this
response to the actions of a supervisor. Eventually, Brown was fired for his
religious activities and other work related errors. He filed claims under Title
VII and other civil rights statutes, alleging racial and religious discrimination.
He also alleged that his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion
had been violated because his employer was a governmental entity. The trial
court held against Mr. Brown, and a panel of the Eighth Circuit initially upheld
this decision. It was eventually reviewed by an en banc panel of that court.
The Eighth Circuit considered whether the employer could have
accommodated these religious practices. The employer did not offer any
accommodation to Brown's religion, and therefore the court could consider any
possible accommodation that would not cause an undue burden. It concluded
that two of the activities-having the secretary type Bible study notes and
prayer sessions before the start of the workday-were not covered activities
under Title VII. First, the Court concluded that typing notes was not a
religious activity mandated by Brown's religious beliefs. In somewhat
conclusory reasoning, the Court reasoned that Title VII does not require an
employer to open its premises for use before the workday begins.
The court did conclude, however, that the comments during department
meetings as well as the prayers at the beginning of meetings in his office did
not amount to an undue burden on the employer's business.20' The employer
argued that the prayers and Bible references would cause "eventual polarization
between born-again Christian employees and other employees," along with
creating a perception that Brown favored Christian employees. 2 2 The County
196. Id. at 652-53.
197. Id. at 655.
198. Id. at 652.
199. Id. at 653.
200. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.




presented no direct testimony from Brown's employees indicating that this was
of concern to them. The court concluded that such instances were not
sufficiently "real," and were too "hypothetical" to meet the undue hardship
standard.203 Further, there was no showing as to an "actual disruption" of the
workplace due to Brown's religious activities.2" On this basis, the court
concluded that there was no undue hardship in accommodating these religious
practices.0 5
In Brown, the court still was open to actual proof of disruption as
presenting an undue burden. While many courts require this proof,2°6 "[e]ven
proof that employees would grumble about a particular accommodation is not
enough to establish undue hardship."2 7 As the Supreme Court itself has noted:
"If relief under Title VII can be denied merely because the majority group of
employees, who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it,
there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the Act is
directed."208  Given this language, perhaps Wilson's mistake was in
characterizing her case as a request for accommodation instead of a straightfor-
ward religious discrimination case. The low burden applicable to religious
accommodation cases may make it easier for an employee to prevail in a
regular disparate treatment situation. For example, if Wilson could have
avoided characterizing her claim as one for accommodation, she certainly could
have raised a prima facie case of discrimination based on her religion. She was
fired because she wore a button based on her religious beliefs. The burden
would then shift to her employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its treatment of Wilson. In this case, the employer's reason would
likely be the time robbing caused by Wilson's wearing the abortion button. As
we have seen above, courts have not upheld such a legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason in the context of other forms of discrimination. 20 9 It is ironic that
the accommodation provision would lead to such a result, when it is clear that
Congress intended it to provide further protection to religious employees. 210
203. Id. at 657 (citations omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Bums v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406-07 (1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589
F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978), reh 'g denied (1979) ("[u]ndue hardship" cannot be proven "by
assumptions nor by opinions based on hypothetical facts").
207. Anderson, 589 F.2d at 402.
208. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775 (1975) (quoting United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971)).
209. See supra notes 173 to 176 and accompanying text.
210. Although the Supreme Court has stated that Congress' purpose in enacting the
accommodation section is somewhat unclear, see Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71-74 & n.9, the
legislative history supports a broader interpretation. See id. at 88-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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B. Religious Slurs as Religious Harassment
The first case to recognize a religious harassment claim was Compton v.
Borden, Inc.211 In this case, the plaintiff was subjected to frequent anti-Semitic
comments after his supervisor discovered that he was Jewish.21 The district
court found that the supervisor "harassed plaintiff by using numerous
derogatory epithets and by engaging in a patterned course of conduct designed
to make his working environment a miserable one., 213 The court concluded
that: "[W]hen a person vested with managerial responsibilities embarks upon
a course of conduct calculated to demean an employee before his fellows
because of the employee's professed religious views, such activity will
necessarily have the effect of altering the conditions of his employment. 214
The court held that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff
because of his religion and national ancestry.21 5 Nevertheless, the court
awarded only nominal damages. 216
Compton's significance lay in the court's recognition that religious
harassment could be severe enough to alter the terms and conditions of a
person's employment. Indeed, the court concluded that the supervisor wanted
to make the environment "miserable." Compton's co-worker testified that "it
was like working under a microscope... I was afraid to do anything too much
211. 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976). In Slamon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 386 F.
Supp. 174 (E.D. Pa. 1974), an employee claimed that he had been subject to repeated anti-
Catholic slurs by his supervisor. The supervisor denied the harassment and the employee was
unable to corroborate his claim. Id.
212. According to the opinion, Compton and his supervisor "got along famously" until
Compton casually mentioned that he was Jewish. At that point the supervisor "began to refer
to Compton, in the presence of his fellow workers, as 'the Jew-boy,' 'the kike,' the Christ-
killer,' 'the damn Jew,", and the 'God-damn Jew."' In addition, the supervisor began to criticize
Compton's work which he had previously found acceptable. Compton, 424 F. Supp. at 158.
213. Id. at 160.
214. Id. at 160-161.
215. Id. at 161. Interestingly, the defendants attacked Compton's claim that he was Jewish.
Compton testified that he was not and never had been a practicing Jew. The court noted that his
"grasp of the fundamental tenets of Judaism is a rather poor one." Id. Compton recalled that,
as a child, his maternal grandmother told him that his paternal grandmother was Jewish. The
court noted that 42 U.S.C. §2000 e (j) defined religion to include "'all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief."' The evidence clearly established that Compton's
religious harassment claim was not a sham; rather, the supervisor's harassment was because of
Compton's Jewish heritage. Compton, 424 F. Supp. at 161.
216. Compton, 424 F. Supp. at 162. Compton was not able to connect his discharge to the
harassment. Thus, he was not entitled to either reinstatement or back pay. Id. The law did not
allow compensatory damages to be awarded, although the court indicated that Compton had
suffered mental anguish and humiliation. Id. at 162. The court awarded $50 in nominal
damages and attorney's fees. Id. at 162-63. For more on viability of harassment claims
connected to some other form of discriminatory conduct, see Beiner, supra note 66, at 656-63.
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unless I checked with him and then get a smart answer, and if I didn't get it,
there was just no escape. That's the way we were harassed. 2 7
In another early case recognizing religious harassment, a federal district
court held that repeated offensive and demeaning religious slurs created a
hostile work environment. In Weiss v. United States,21 9 the employee claimed
that he was the constant target of religious slurs from co-workers and from his
supervisor. 219  "[D]emeaning and offensive religious slurs . . . necessarily
[have] the effect of altering the conditions of... employment within the
meaning of Title VII. 'z20  According to the court: "[c]ontinuous abusive
language, whether racist, sexist, or religious in form, can often pollute a healthy
working environment by making an employee feel uncomfortable or unwanted
in his surroundings. In more extreme cases such as this one, it can even
severely affect the employee's emotional and psychological stability."22 Weiss
showed that the constant explicit religious harassment continued until he
complained. After that time, however, his supervisor made unreasonable and
inappropriate demands on him.222
The court concluded that Weiss' eventual dismissal for poor job
performance was a pretext disguising the underlying religious discrimination. 23
An employer cannot rely on sub-par work performance when the employer is
responsible for the creation of a hostile work environment. 24  Once an
employer is put on notice about religious harassment, the employer must do
more than simply declare that harassment is officially prohibited. The
employer bears an especially heavy burden when supervisory personnel
acquiesce and participate in the harassment.225
217. Compton, 424 F. Supp. at 159.
218. 595 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984).
219. Id. at 1053. The slurs included "such taunts as 'resident Jew,' 'Jew faggot,' 'rich Jew,'
'Christ killer,' 'nail him to the cross,' and 'you killed Christ, Wally, so you'll have to hang from
the cross."' Id. at 1053. Just as in Compton, the supervisor's harassment began after the
employee told him that he was Jewish. Id.
220. Id. at 1056 (citations omitted).
221. Id. Weiss showed that the harassment caused him to develop a variety of emotional
and physical problems including bleeding hands, headaches, and nausea which affected his job
performance. Id. at 1055.
222. Id. at 1054-55. For example, the supervisor criticized Weiss' work in front of other
workers, revoked prior approval to present a symposium paper, kept tabs on Weiss's work with
an eye toward building a record against him, and suddenly gave a lower appraisal of Weiss's
work, blaming Weiss for delays beyond his control, failing to give Weiss the necessary
assistance to complete projects on time, and "by glaring at Weiss and generally treating him
with a hostile attitude." Id. at 1054.
223. Id. at 1056.
224. Id. at 1057 (citations omitted).
225. Id. Weiss showed that his employer took no action after he complained of the initial
abuse and the subsequent retaliation. Moreover, they relied exclusively on the harasser's
representations about Weiss's job performance in deciding to fire Weiss. Id. On the other
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More recently, a state court refused to find an employer liable for a hostile
religious environment when it took prompt and repeated action against a
supervisor who used religious slurs. In Vaughn v. AG Processing, Inc.,226 the
plaintiff showed that he was subjected to repeated anti-Catholic slurs. 227 The
Iowa Supreme court recognized the existence of a religious hostile environment
claim. 228  They ruled against the plaintiff on the ultimate liability issue,
however.229
Unlike Weiss, the employer took prompt action to discipline the offending
employee and to remedy the harassment. 230 Also, unlike Weiss, the employer
did not discharge the employee. Instead, the employee walked off the job and
refused to report to work if he had to work under his supervisor.23' Moreover,
the employer made the supervisor apologize, promised that the supervisor's
behavior would improve, and three times offered to rehire Vaughn over the
course of almost two months.232
hand, the employer disciplined Weiss's co-worker for calling Weiss "'the laziest motherfucker
in the office' during a branch meeting. Id. at 1053. Nevertheless, Weiss believed that the
hostile work environment led to this outburst. This became the "traumatizing event which
triggered an obsessive, and perhaps vindictive reaction" toward the supervisor and this co-
worker. Id.
226. 459 N.W. 2d 627 (Iowa 1990).
227. Id. at 631. The abuse started after the employee asked for some time off to attend
church services. Thereafter, the supervisor "called him a 'goddamn stupid fuckin' Catholic' and
referred to another employee as '[a]nother dumb Catholic."' The supervisor also claimed that
he had never seen a Catholic "that had any fuckin' brains." In addition, the supervisor made
comments about the birth rates of Catholics. Id.
228. "We therefore find no reason why . . . [anti-harassment] protection should not
similarly apply to victims of religious discrimination." Id. at 632.
229. Id. at 635.
230. For example, the employer investigated the supervisor's behavior, placed a written
reprimand in his file, verbally reprimanded him, continued to monitor his behavior, and offered
him an opportunity for professional counseling. Id. at 634-635.
231. Id. at 631.
232. Id. It is not clear from the record if and when the employer terminated Vaughn.
Vaughn filed for unemployment on July 3, two weeks after walking off the job. The employer
also offered Vaughn a chance to return to his job on August 5. Vaughn filed his discrimination
complaint on September 29. Id.
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These are easy and non-controversial cases." 3 If Title VII and other anti-
discrimination laws did not protect Jewish employees from being called
"kikes" or Catholics from abusive comments, they would fail to meet even the
most minimal expectations of their supporters.23 In this respect these cases
resemble cases in which racial minorities have made out claims of harassment
on the basis of racial epithets.235 They are also easy and non-controversial
because it does not take a great leap of legal imagination nor a large stretch of
existing precedent to conceptualize the claim. Courts have no trouble
importing the standards from racial and sexual harassment cases to religious
harassment cases.236 Moreover, the application of these standards are easy to
understand. There is little practical or conceptual difference between
subjecting a person to repeated racial epithets or repeated religious epithets.
Both "pollute a healthy working environment by making an employee feel
uncomfortable and unwanted in his surroundings.
2 37
233. See also McHugh v. University of Vermont, 966 F. 2d 67 (2d Cir. 1992) (anti-Catholic
remarks sufficient to establish claim for religious harassment); Amin v. Quad/Graphics, Inc.,
929 F. Supp. 73 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (religious harassment of Muslim employee also related to
racial and national origin harassment); Baron v. Grainger, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Il1.
1996) (occasional anti-Semitic remarks and stereotypical comments sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of religious discrimination); Goldberg v. Philadelphia, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8969 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (anti-Semitic comments would have detrimentally affected a reasonable
Jewish person); Yudovich v. Stone, 839 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. Va. 1993) (anti-Semitic comments
and offensive symbols); Smallzman v. Sea Breeze, Inc., 1993 WL 15904 (D. Md. 1993) (anti-
Semitic comments); Turner v. Barr, 806 F. Supp. 1025 (D. D.C. 1992) (anti-Semitic comments);
Imperial Diner v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 417 N.E.2d 525 (N.Y. 1980) (single anti-
Semitic tirade sufficient to find discrimination); But see Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 925
F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (no hostile environment created because anti-Semitic comments
not pervasive); Rosen v. Bailer, 1995 WL 264169 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (supervisor's born-again
Christianity by itself did not create hostile environment absent slurs); Thomason v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Kan. 1994) (occasional religious slurs not sufficient to allow
recovery under state law for tort of outrage); Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536
F. Supp. 1149 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (political comments about Israel and Jewish organizations did
not amount to religious harassment).
234. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
235. See, e.g., Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1994); Rodgers v.
Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684
F.2d 1355 (11 th Cir. 1982).
236. See, e.g., Compton v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976); see also
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65-66; Cobb v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 793 F. Supp.
1457 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
237. Weiss, 509 F. Supp. at 1056. Cf. Imperial Diner v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd.,
417 N.E.2d 525 (N.Y. 1980), where the court held that one religious tirade directed at the
employee was sufficiently harmful.
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C. Religious Expression as Religious Harassment
Courts have also found a religious hostile environment in cases where the
employer 3 . used the workplace to engage in religious discussion, proclama-
tion, or proselytization. 39 In Brown Transport Corp. v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania,24° the court found religious harassment when an employer failed
to remove certain religious material from the workplace. In this case the
employer placed Christian Bible verses on employee paychecks.24' A Jewish
employee complained about these verses and also about the religious content
of some articles in the company newsletter. The verses and articles
238. Although there is a good deal of discussion about the employer's potential liability
when an employee engages in harassing religious conduct on the job, we have found only one
case where liability for a hostile environment was imposed. See Sapp's Realty, Or. Comm'r of
Bureau of Labor and Indus., Case No. 11-83 (January 31, 1985) (employer liable when it failed
to take action against co-worker who constantly proselytized). Employers and courts, however,
assume that the employer will be liable in such cases. See, e.g., Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of
Richmond, 1996 WL 692127, at *10 (4th Cir. Va. Dec. 4. 1996) (acknowledging that an
employer who allowed an employee to send religious letters to a co-worker might be liable for
religious harassment); Wilson v. U.S. West, 58 F.3d at 1342 ("Title VII does not require an
employer to allow an employee to impose... religious views on others."); Peck v. Sony Music
Corp., 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1995) (trier of fact could find
religiously hostile workplace due to instances of proselytization whether harasser was
supervisor or co-worker).
239. In addition to the cases discussed infra, see Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d
703 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding employer violated Title VII by firing employee after religious
disagreement) cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1064 (1989); Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n.,
507 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding mandatory devotional service violates Title VII);
Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights v. Lesco Mfg. and Design Co., 736 S.W. 2d 361 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1987) (finding employer failed to reasonably accommodate an employee who refused on
religious grounds to use a Christmas greeting when answering phone); Commission Decision,
No. 72-1114, EEOC Decisions 6347 (1972) (finding a hostile environment existed when
supervisor attempted to convert co-workers on the job). For a discussion of these cases, see
Thomas D. Brierton, supra note 97.
240. 578 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1990).




continued.242 Eventually, the company fired the employee who thereafter sued
for retaliatory discharge and religious harassment.243
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held for the employee on both
his discharge and his harassment claim.2" The court noted that the religious
material caused the employee "to question his job security and led him to
believe that a [Brown Transport Company] employee needed to be Christian
to be promoted into upper management. 245  Therefore, the employer's
conditions of employment constituted religious harassment of the employee.2 6
In State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc,247 the Minnesota Supreme Court
found religious discrimination when the employer expressly based workplace
policies on religious principles. The employer, a health club, interviewed
prospective employees on their religious beliefs,24s only promoted born-again
Christians,249 based its workplace rules on its interpretation of the Bible,2 ° held
Bible studies at the workplace (some mandatory and some voluntary), 25' and
242. 578 S.2d at 542-50. Sofer, the complainant, was hired in 1981. The company began
printing bible verses on paychecks in June 1983. Sofer immediately complained and asked that
the verses be removed from his paycheck. Id. at 557-58. He renewed his request four months
later. Id. at 558. In January 1984, the company re-instituted a company newsletter that had
been discontinued in 1970. The newsletter contained articles that Sofer perceived as religious
and he complained to management about them. Brown Transp. Co., 578 A.2d at 558. The
newsletter continued and similar articles appeared in March, April, and May. Id. at 561. Sofer
was abruptly fired in June for poor and inconsistent job performance in spite of consistently
superior job evaluations, including one two months before his termination. Id. at 560. The only
negative information in his file was a memorandum which appeared after he complained about
the Bible verses. The memorandum characterized Sofer as the "mouse that roars" and suggested
that this trait would stunt his career. Id. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
concluded that this referred to the action that resulted in Sofer's termination. Id. at 560-61.
243. Id. at 558.
244. Brown Transp. Co., 578 A.2d at 562.
245. Id.
246. Id. But see Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995), in which
the court found a hostile environment because of the employer's religious proselytization but
refused to impose liability in the absence of actual knowledge that the activity was harmful to
the employee or an intention to do so.
247. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dismissedfor lack ofjuris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
248. Prospective employees were asked (I) whether or not they read the Bible and attended
church, (2) questions about their marital status, (3) whether or not they engaged in pre-marital
or extra-marital sex, (4) and questions about their specific religious beliefs such as whether or
not they believed in God, heaven, hell, etc. Id. at 847.
249. The company admitted that only born-again Christians could become managers or
assistant managers because of their belief that the Bible did not allow them to work with
unbelievers. Id. This policy was also related to the mandatory Bible studies. See infra note
251.
250. The court described these as "rigid workplace rules based on the Bible (requiring a
high degree of discipline and submissiveness), 'backbiting,' and 'non-joyful' attitude[s] on the
part of the employee[s]," and a "teachable spirit" and "disciplined lifestyle." Id.
251. Bible studies were a "substantial part" of weekly managers' meetings. Voluntary
Bible studies were held for the rest of the sales staff. Id.
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based hiring and firing decisions on whether the employees "are not offended
by the owners' faith, are not antagonistic toward the Christian gospel, and will
comply with management's work rules in a cheerful and obedient spirit. 252
Although noting that the employer's beliefs were legitimate, the court
nevertheless held that their actions constituted discrimination on the basis of
religion.25' According to the court:
Sports and Health, in some instances, went far beyond legally permissible
bounds in questioning applicants and employees. The evidence clearly
substantiates the findings of the hearing examiner that questioning
concerning religious beliefs, practices, and concerning marital status
permeated the employment process and were the true reasons for the
actions taken by Sports and Health. 254
The court also upheld a finding that the club did not provide an open public
accommodation on the basis of a complaint that a customer canceled her
membership because she was offended by the religious literature on display.255
Finally, in EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co.,256 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer was required to excuse
an atheist employee from attendance at mandatory workplace prayer services.
The employers covenanted with God that their business would be "a Christian,
faith-operated business., 25 7 They insisted that they were "unable to separate
252. Id. at 848. These policies prohibited unmarried cohabitation with persons of the
opposite sex, young, single women working without their father's consent or married women
working without their husband's consent, hiring people with strong commitments to non-
Christian religions, and employing "fornicators and homosexuals." Id. at 847.
253. Id. at 850.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 849. One of the complainants claimed that she canceled her membership
because the religious literature on display in the club offended her. The club's legal troubles
continued. See State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 392 N.W. 2d 329 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986),
in which the court upheld a finding of contempt when the club handed out a statement of their
religiously based beliefs to each prospective employee.
256. 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989). See also Young v.
Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n., 509 F. 2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (ruling mandatory attendance
at devotional service violated Title VII). Compare Kolodziej v. Smith, 588 N.E.2d 634 (Mass.
1992) (finding religiously based motivational seminars not religious exercise and forced
attendance not religious discrimination); Hiatt v. Walker Chev. Co., 837 P.2d 618 (Wash. 1992)
(finding attendance at religiously offensive seminar not job requirement); Beasley v. Health
Care Serv. Corp., 940 F. 2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling no religious harassment when
employer required business to be religiously devout employee's first priority) and Bellini v.
University of St. Thomas, 1994 WL 425166 (Minn. App. 1994) (mandatory attendance at
Roman Catholic mass not religious harassment absent actual or constructive knowledge of
employee's objections); Commission Decision No. 91-1, 1991 WL 77565 (EEOC 1991)
(finding employer failed to accommodate employees' claims that training course put on by
religious organization conflicted with their own religious beliefs).
257. Townley, 859 F.2d at 612. A covenant has a religious significance that sets it apart
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God from any portion of their daily lives, including their activities at the
Townley company. 258
The employee attended the services for a brief period of time before he
asked to be excused. 9 Management refused, telling him that he could sleep
or read the newspaper during the service. Several months later, the employee
filed a complaint with the EEOC. He left the company two months later,
claiming that he was constructively discharged.
260
The court found that Townley discriminated against the employee by
failing to accommodate his request to be excused from attendance at the
devotional services. The court rejected Townley's claim that an accommoda-
tion would create an undue spiritual hardship. Rather, the court concluded that
Title VII
posits a gain-seeking employer exclusively concerned with preserving and
promoting its economic efficiency.... It follows that Townley's attempt
to link the alleged spiritual hardship to the conduct of the business must
fail. It is not enough to argue that Townley was founded to 'share with all
of its employees the spiritual aspects of the company'. . . and that the
proposed accommodation would have a "chilling effect" on that purpose.
To "chill" its purpose is irrelevant if it has no effect on its economic well-
being.261
At first glance, these cases present little concern. They appear to be
examples of employers imposing their religious views on their employees.
Indeed, Sports and Health Club can be characterized as an example of the
worst kind of discrimination: intolerant exclusion of people from the workplace
because of their beliefs. There is a disturbing undercurrent in these cases that
should cause us to be more circumspect in our reading of them.
These cases seem to conclude that religion has no place in the workplace.
Professor Laura Underkuffler argues that "[w]hat is striking about [cases like
these] is their underlying assumption that the implementation of religious
from an ordinary contract. A covenant "establishes a new relationship, a promise of an
exchange of powers, and the attendant rights and duties that follow the contract." THE
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 140 (1987). The relationship between Yahweh and the Israelites is
covenantal; that is, Yahweh makes and remakes a series of covenants with the Israelites that
indicate Yahweh's enduring faithfulness as well as the Israelites enduring obligations to
Yahweh.
258. Townley, 859 F.2d at 612. The company also included a religious tract in every piece
of outgoing mail and financially supported church and missionary work. Id.
259. Pelvas, the complainant, was hired in 1979, but devotional services did not begin at
the plant until April 1984. Pelvas complained two months later. Id.
260. Id. Pelvas filed his complaint in October 1984 and left the company in December of
that same year. The EEOC filed an action against the company in July 1986. Id.
261. Townley, 859 F.2d at 616.
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policies, practices, or values by the employer is inherently discriminatory." '262
There is almost no analysis of what the underlying discrimination is in these
cases. Instead, the court assumes discrimination, believing that: "1. That
individual decision-making can be "religiously neutral," or free of religious
influence. 2. That absent statutory or constitutional exemption, the implemen-
tation of religious beliefs, policies, or practices by the employer in the
workplace is discrimination on the basis of religion and should be
prohibited. 263
The complainant in Brown, for example, stated his opinion that "religion
should not be part of business affairs. ' '264 He went on to say that he would have
been offended even if his own religion had been featured on the paychecks and
in the newsletter.265 In Sports and Health Club, the hearing examiner declared
that the "essence" of the employer's business was not "discipleship" but "the
operation of an exercise emporium."' 266 In both Sports & Health Club and
Townley, the courts rejected the claim that these companies were religious
corporations. The Minnesota court drew a distinct line between private belief
and secular commerce. 267 The Ninth Circuit looked at the product that the
company produced to conclude that the defendant was "primarily secular.,
261
Finally, the cases were prosecuted as though the employer "was simply one
more racist bigot., 269 Indeed, the state characterized Sport and Health Club's
actions as extreme bigotry.270
These factors illustrate how religion is seen as a stranger or an intruder
into the workplace. The baseline logic is circular: if the business is "secular,"
then it can't be religious and if it is religious, it can't be secular. The result is
262. Underkuffler, supra note 29, at 588.
263. Underkuffler, supra note 29, at 588.
264. Brown Transp. Corp., 578 A.2d at 561.
265. Id.
266. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 859 (Petersen, J., dissenting).
267. In Sports & Health Club, the court stated the company "is a Minnesota business
corporation engaged in business for profit. By engaging in this secular endeavor, appellants
have passed over the line that affords them absolute freedom to exercise religious beliefs." Id.
at 853.
268. The court noted that "[o]n the secular side, the company is for profit. It produces
mining equipment, an admittedly secular product. It is not affiliated with or supported by a
church. Its articles of incorporation do not mention any religious purpose." EEOC v. Townley,
859 F.2d at 619. When weighed against the religious practices of the owners of the company,
the court had "no difficulty in holding that these characteristics indicate that Townley is
primarily secular." Id.
269. Townley, 859 F.2d at 624 (Noonan, J. dissenting).
270. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 852 n.15. The majority disagreed that "[i]t is
questionable whether the characterization of appellant's actions as bigotry is appropriate....
In each instance, appellants relied on commands found in the New Testament of the Bible,
which, if not followed, they claim, would condemn them to perdition." Id.
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not neutral, however. It makes a sharp distinction between the secular and the
sacred that is itself a theological judgment and that many workers are not
willing or able to make.
Vigorous dissents in two cases pursued these themes. In Townley, Judge
John Noonan noted that the majority declared accommodation a "transcendent
principle." This was an especially ironic designation in this case because
"[t]ranscendent principles are those that rise above the here and now" and "link
human beings to shared goods of the spirit and their transtemporal destiny." '271
To Noonan, the danger is that secularism becomes the ultimate theological
judgment in these cases. "Secular men and women take secular values
seriously. Men and women of the world believe that the world's business is
important."'272 When courts weigh religious freedom against other claims, the
"result should not be foreordained by Congress choosing a secular value as
overriding. 27 3 Moreover, drawing a sharp line between secular and religious
activity is a "species of theology. The theological position is that human
beings should worship God on Sundays or some other chosen day and go about
their business without reference to God the rest of the time. 274
When a governmental agency decides that a business is primarily secular
in spite of the sincerely held religious beliefs of the owners, the agency makes
"a theological judgment 
- a theological judgment fairly characterized as
reflecting either a secularism skeptical of God's existence and power or a
species of deism that radically isolates God from the world that believers
believe God created and animates and directs. 275
In Sports and Health Club, dissenting Judge Peterson criticized the
administrative agency for substituting their business judgment for that of the
company. He went on to say the following:
The examiner, at the same time, decrees a dichotomy between Owens'
beliefs and practices, divorces the sacred from the secular, does not
distinguish praying on one's kniees on Sunday from preying on other
persons in the marketplace on Monday, and perceives no significant
difference between the commitment of conviction and the detachment of
a possibly more casual Sabbath ceremony or community convention.276
The "problem" is religion, or at least those people who take it seriously. 277
People who cannot make the sharp distinction between the religious and the
271. Townley, 859 F.2d at 623 (Noonan, J. dissenting).
272. Id. at 624.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 625.
275. Id. at 625.
276. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 859 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 860, quoting Dr. Peter J. Gomes.
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secular and who are willing to take religious commands seriously in the
workplace, present "a disquieting challenge to the larger social and governmen-
tal order. 2 78 This fear manifests itself as "a latent spirit of indifference, if not
hostility, to deeply held religious beliefs., 279 Thus, religious expression is
characterized as "extreme bigotry" or "harassment" or "discrimination.
280
The reluctance of courts to allow religious secular employers to create a
religious workplace environment exacerbates the situation of religiously devout
employees. It bottles up the religious energy of some employees. 28' It places
religious employees in a "Catch 22" situation. If employers are prohibited
from making any expression of their religious beliefs in the workplace, then
workers are prevented from making employment choices on the basis of
religious compatibility.282 If they enter the "secular" marketplace, they will be
prohibited from "too much" religion on the job. At the same time, they are
expected to endure a workplace that quite possibly confronts them with
activities that will offend their core religious sensibilities. If they are not able
to ask the employer to take reasonable remedial measures to fix the most
egregious problems, we have effectively shut religion out of the workplace.
D. Offensive Conduct or Displays as Religious Harassment
In a third category of cases workers complain about workplace activity
that is not itself religious but which is either directed at an employee because
of his religious beliefs or offends the employee's beliefs. Religious discrimina-
tion cases are rare.283 Cases in which offensive conduct or offensive displays
constitute religious harassment are even more rare.284
In Finnemore v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co.,285 the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court reversed the trial court's order finding against the employee.
278. Underkuffler, supra note 29, at 609.
279. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 875 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
280. See, e.g., Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 852 n.15.
281. Cf Frederick Mark Gedicks, Some Political Implications of Religious Belief, 4 N.D.
J. OF LAW, ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y. 419, 432 (1990) (postulating that imposition of secularism
might alienate religious believers prompting marginalization or revolt).
282. Cf Sports & Health Club, 370 N. W. 2d at 871 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
283. See supra notes 85-86.
284. In Beasley v. Health Care Serv. Corp, 940 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1991), the religiously
devout plaintiff showed that she had been called a "religious hypocrite," "Bible Bertha," and
a "religious nut." Id. at 1086. In addition, she was instructed not to harass employees on
religious subjects in spite of the lack of evidence that she had ever done so. Although the lower
court found that these instances did not amount to harassment, the court of appeals did not reach
the issue. Id. at 1088-89. The court found it unnecessary to consider the question of
harassment because it concluded that her discharge was for good cause. Id. at 1089.
285. 645 A.2d 15 (Me. 1994).
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During work breaks, the employees regularly made sexually explicit comments
about their wives.2' Finnemore, a "fundamentalist Christian," complained to
them that their comments offended his religion.287 Instead of stopping, they
began to make Finnemore's wife the target of their explicit comments. He
complained to management and repeated his complaints to his co-workers. 28
Management took no action and his co-workers' conduct continued. 8 9 After
receiving sexually explicit letters through the company mail system, he once
again complained to management, who again took no action.290 About a month
later he applied for a transfer to another department. He received the transfer
but would have had to remain in his current position for an additional three
months.29' He resigned because of the verbal harassment and the delay in the
transfer.292
The trial court granted the company's motion for summary judgement
because "the co-workers' comments were not religious in nature.' 293 The
Supreme Court of Maine reversed. Maine law expressly created a claim for
religious hostile environment, mirroring the now familiar language for sexual
harassment. 294 The court noted that no federal cases had dealt with sexually
explicit comments as the basis for a religious harassment claim in the absence
of overt religious slurs.295 Because Maine law required that the comments be
"of a religious nature," the court applied a" but for" test: "whether it occurred
because of an individual's religious beliefs or would not have occurred but for
the individual's religion." 296 Because there was a genuine issue of fact on this
286. Id. at 16.
287. Finnemore said: "How can you guys talk like this.., it's offensive to my religion."
Id.
288. Id. According the court, Finnemore "repeatedly told his co-workers that he objected
to their remarks because his relationship with his wife was both private and sacred." Id.
289. Id. at 16.
290. Id. at 15.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 16.
293. Id. at 16 n.2.
294.. The Maine Human Rights Commission defined religious harassment on the basis of
religion as " [u]nwelcome comments, jokes, acts or other verbal or physical conduct of a
religious nature" when "such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with
an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment." Id. at 17 (citing Maine Human Rights Comm'n. Emp. Reg. 3.10 (G) (1)).
295. Id. The court cited Weiss, Compton, Vaughn, and Turner v. Barr, 811 F. Supp. I
(D.D.C. 1993) (ruling joke about holocaust and offensive stereotypical comments constitute
religious harassment), and Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149 (M.D.
Pa. 1982) (finding that statements on Middle East issues did not constitute religious
harassment).
296. Finnemore, 645 A.2d at 17. Cf Taylor v. National Group Co., 729 F. Supp. 575, 577
(N.D. Ohio) (finding no evidence of religious discrimination where employer distributed a book
purportedly endorsing "Secular Humanism" to new employees).
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question, the court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the
employer.297
Other courts and lawyers have struggled to conceptualize these claims as
religious harassment. 291 In Golden v. G.B. Goldman Paper Company,29 the
employee claimed that he was the target of workplace harassment. Co-workers
fondled and rubbed their genitals around him because they knew, as a religious
person, he found such activity offensive.3 ° In spite of his complaints, the
employer took no remedial action.30 1 Eventually, the employee transferred to
another division within the company at a lower rate of pay.302
Incredibly, the plaintiff did not plead religious harassment. Instead, he
claimed sexual harassment.303 The district court dismissed this claim, noting
that "the defendant's employees harassed the plaintiff using sexual gestures but
they harassed him because of his religious beliefs."3°4 Because this harassment
was "unrelated to the disparate treatment of men and women," the plaintiff did
not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.3' Rubbing salt into the
wound, the court quoted the complaint: the defendant's employees behaved
the way they did "knowing that plaintiff, being a highly religious and moral
man, found such sexual conduct highly offensive, unwelcome, and
obnoxious.,
30 6
Here was a clear case where the employee's work environment was
poisoned by conduct directed at him because of his religion.307 Although there
were no ugly religious slurs, the conduct created an environment no less
offensive than if slurs had occurred. If Golden had been a women, liability is
297. Finnemore, 645 A.2d at 17.
298. See, e.g., Kelly v. Municipal Courts of Marion County, 97 F.3d 902, 918 (7th Cir.
1996), in which an employee was harassed because of his religious beliefs about pre-marital
sex. Nevertheless, he "failed to advance a coherent legal framework" for this claim, vacillating
between an Equal Protection theory and a vague Religion Clause theory. Id. Accordingly, the
Seventh circuit affirmed the district court's adverse judgment.
299. 1991 WL 157385 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1991).
300. Id.
301. Id. Golden complained to his supervisor and pursued a formal grievance. Id. at * 1.
302. Id.
303. See also White v. Dial Corp, 882 F. Supp. 701, 708 (E.D. I1. 1994), afdby 52 F.3d
329 (7th Cir. 1995) (where female plaintiff failed to show that religious objections to foul
language established sexual harassment claim).
304. Golden, 1991 WL 15738, at *2.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Cf Kelley v. Municipal Courts of Marion County, 97 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1996), where
the plaintiff failed to coherently plead his claim in a case similar to Finnemore and Golden.
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obvious. 30 8 It should not take a great leap of legal imagination to apply the
standards from gender and race cases to the facts of Golden.3o9
Plaintiffs like Mr. Golden suffer the same harm as that of employees
harassed because of race and gender.3 l° He was subjected to job conditions
different than other employees. His job horizons were limited because he had
to choose between earning a living or leaving his faith. For those employees
who are not able to quit their jobs to pursue more compatible workplaces, they
must spend most of their waking hours in an environment that violates their
sacred and core identities.
Courts may have trouble taking non-mainstream religious claims
seriously. In Juzwick v. Frank,1 the court granted summary judgment for the
employer on a religious hostile environment claim. The employee, who
worked at McDonald's, complained when music with misogynistic, violent,
and sexually explicit lyrics was played over the store sound system. Juzwick
claimed that the music offended his religious beliefs. The district court found
that the plaintiff failed to show that anyone played the music with the intent to
harass him: "[t]here is nothing to link the playing of the offensive music...
to [Juzwick's] allegations that management intended to [discriminate against
him] because of his religion. 31 3
The court muddled the analysis of his religious claim, finding that the
music was not played with the intent to discriminate against the plaintiffs
religion even though in race and gender cases intent is not a required element
of the claim. 4 The court conflated the issue of the employer's response with
308. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 733 (1995); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th Cir.
1993); Cf Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538-39 (10th Cir. 1995).
309. Frequently religious harassment is intermingled with race or national origin
discrimination. See Weiss, 595 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984) (national origin); Turner, 806
F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1992) (race). In Rasheed v. Chrysler Corp., 517 N.W.2d 19 (Mich.
1994), the Muslim plaintiff proved religious discrimination in a case involving harassment with
racial, religious, and national origin overtones. The trial court dismissed his religious
harassment claim, however.
310. See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, supra note 83, at 57.; CELIA MORRIS,
BEARING WITNESS: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND BEYOND (1994).
311. No. 93-1082, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19416 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
312. The plaintiff specifically complained about playing music by the Rap group, 2 LIvE
CREw. Their 1989 release, As NASTY AS THEY WANNA BE, uses the word "fuck" over 200
times, uses over 100 explicit references to male and female genitalia, contains over 80
descriptions of oral sex, and uses the word "bitch" over 150 times. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER,
CULTURE WARS 232 (1991). The group was involved in a highly publicized obscenity trial.
See Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F. 2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992) (reversing obscenity
conviction), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022 (1992).
313. Juzwick v. Frank, No. 93-1082, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19416 at *10 (W.D. Pa.
1994).
314. See supra notes 39 to 81 and accompanying text. Cf. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
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the employee's cause of action. If the employer makes a reasonable response
or if the harassment is not pervasive, then the employer is not liable. Indeed
in Juzwick, a dispute existed as to whether or not the infrequent playing of the
music was pervasive and whether or not the employer was responsible for the
music.,,,
Instead of pursuing this analysis the court impatiently dismissed the
plaintiff's claim. The court pointed out, for no apparent reason, that Juzwick
ran a religious publishing business that published primarily his own writings.3 16
Juzwick believed that pornography "was the root cause of many of the nation's
evils., 317 In a revealing footnote, the court seemed to mock these views noting
that they "transcend[ed] those of most anti-pomographers."'31 One takes from
this case the impression that the court felt that real men, or perhaps more aptly,
real Christians, would not complain about such innocuous things as the music
played in McDonald's.319
The problem is not limited to religious harassment cases.- Some courts
discount harassment claims by suggesting that claimants are overly sensitive
or that Title VII was not meant to change longstanding "innocent" behavior.32°
The confrontation has been intense along gender lines because of the
U.S. 17 (1993) (finding a hostile environment exists if employee perceives or can perceive it
to be hostile); Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 925 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is not
necessary to show intent in a case challenging a discriminatory working environment."). Race:
See, e.g., Newton v. Department of the Air Force, 85 F.3d 595, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The
existence of specific discriminatory intent vel non is, in short, not an element of a 'hostile work
environment' claim."); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he thrust of
Title VII's proscriptions is aimed at the consequences or effect of an employment practice and
not at the employer's motivation.") cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Sex: See e.g., King v.
Frazier, 77 F. 3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (using intent improperly interjected mens rea from
criminal law into sexual harassment law) cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 62 (1996); Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F. 2d 934-35 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[S]exual stereotyping... may be benign in intent ... yet
it violates Title VII.").
315. Juzwick, No. 93-1082, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19416 at *11.
316. Id. at* 3.
317. Id.
318. The court pointed out that the plaintiff believed that "the Washington Monument and
the Statue of Liberty are demonic sexual symbols which were erected to corrupt the American
people." Id. at *3 n.2.
319. Cf. EEOC v. Townley, 859 F.2d 610, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (warning about the trouble
mainstream judges might have deciding cases involving non-mainstream religious claims), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
320. See Gross v. BurggrafConstr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537-38 (10th Cir. 1995). There,
the court declared that in the "real world of construction work, profanity and vulgarity are not
perceived as hostile or abusive." Instead, such language is considered "normal human
behavior." Id. See also Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich.
1984), aff'd 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (Title VII not designed to "bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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significantly different ways men and women may view the same behavior.12'
The potential for similar conflict exists in religious harassment claims.
Suppose Vaughn's co-workers had just spoken "roughly" but not with a
religious bias, or suppose that, as in the Jacksonville Shipyards322 cise,
religiously devout male workers had objected to nude pictures? Should anti-
discrimination law recognize a cause of action for these types of religious
hostile environment claims?
The only case to deal with this question is Lambert v. Condor Manufac-
turing Inc.323 The plaintiff objected to working in an area adorned with
pictures of naked women.324 He complained and asked that the pictures be
removed. When they remained, he refused to work in the area where the
pictures were located.32 Instead of removing the pictures, the employer offered
to transfer Lambert to another shift.326 The court found that Lambert made out
the elements of a religious discrimination claim.327
Current harassment law should be extended to instances of religious
harassment like the above.328 Cases like Finnemore provide the best model.
They do not relegate religion to a lesser realm of protection; they respect the
important role religion plays in many workers' lives. Nevertheless, applying
conventional harassment law does not tip the scales completely in favor of the
321. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (men may view sexual
conduct in a vacuum without appreciation for women's legitimate fears); Lipsett v. University
of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (comments about woman's figure may be
acceptable to some men but offensive to some women). See generally Nancy J. Ehrenreich,
Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1207-08 (1990) (men may view some sexual harassment as "harmless
social interaction to which only overly-sensitive women would object").
322. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (citing
twenty-nine separate instances of pornographic pictures posted throughout the workplace as
partial basis for finding hostile environment).
323. 768 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
324. Id. at 601. The case reveals little about the physical layout of the work area. There is
one indication that the plaintiff worked on machinery and that the pictures were located on or
near the machines. Id. at 602.
325. Id. at 602. The parties disagreed on these issues, however. The defendant challenged
the sincerity of the plaintiff's beliefs, and denied that the plaintiff ever informed the employer
of his religious objections to the pictures. Id.
326. Id. at 603.
327. Id. at 604. The court also rejected the employers' First Amendment defense to the
removal of the pictures. Unfortunately, the court incorrectly concluded that the First
Amendment did not apply because Lambert worked for a private company. The court failed
to distinguish the right of a private employer to restrict speech and a coercive judicial order
allowing a private party to restrict speech. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791, 1798 (1991).
328. For a discussion of some of the same cases from the perspective of advising employers




complaining worker. The employee must show "severe" or "pervasive"
religious harassment.329 Single instances generally do not rise to the level of
harassment. 330 Employers are allowed the flexibility to make "reasonable"
responses to the harassment complaint,3  and other employees are put on
notice that their conduct offends someone's religious beliefs.
E. The Problem with Accommodation in Hostile Environment Cases
Most of the Lambert opinion dealt with whether the offer to transfer
amounted to a reasonable accommodation. The accommodation question
centered around whether the employer must remove the pornographic pictures
or need only offer to remove Lambert. Phrased in this way, an accommodation
requirement seems out of place. Perhaps the accommodation requirement may
not apply to hostile environment claims.332 The accommodation section seems
to contemplate the employee asking the employer for "special" treatment or for
an exemption because of his religion.333 The typical accommodation case
involves an employee who asks to be exempted from work on his Sabbath or
holy day. 3 4 In these cases, the employee asks for a waiver of a workplace rule
of general applicability. 331
329. See e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (finding conduct must be
severe or pervasive); Paulsen v. Guidant Corp., 1996 WL 745280 (Minn. App. 1996) (isolated
comments did not establish harassment); Ellis v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 1996 WL 774770 (M.D.
Ala. 1996) (single remark not sufficient to create hostile environment); Rosen v. Baker, 1995
WL 264169, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (using the Harris standard to deny a claim of a religious
hostile environment); Sarin v. Raytheon, 905 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding employer's
prompt response legally sufficient to shield it from liability); Kantar v. Baldwin Cooke Co.,
1995 W.L. 692022 (N.D. I11. 1995) (ruling handful of comments over two years not severe or
pervasive enough to establish hostile environment).
330. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (finding single offensive
comment does not alter a condition of employment).
331. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71; Vaughn v. AG Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d
627, 634 (Iowa 1990).
332. One commentator has suggested that the failure to reasonably accommodate a person
with a disability would be a factor to consider in assessing a claim for workplace harassment
based on disability. Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availability
and Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1475 (1994).
333. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e j) (1994).
334. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218
(1991); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Protos v. Volkswagen of
Am. Inc., 797 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986).
335. Frank Ravitch argues that the accommodation requirement of the Americans with
Disabilities Act is unique because it is "required to enable the employee to perform his or her
job. The accommodation of religious observances by an employer does not enable that
employee to perform the job; it simply acknowledges that employees have a right observe their
religious beliefs without being discriminated against. . . ." Ravitch, supra note 332, at 1509
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In a hostile environment case, however, the employee is not asking for
anything special. Instead, the employee is asking for what everyone is entitled
to: a workplace free from hostility on the basis of race, color, sex, national
origin, and religion. There is no general rule to waive. The employer, in a race
or gender case, must make a reasonable response to the harassment claim.
336
It would not be reasonable to transfer a woman or a racial minority away from
the harassment if it alters a term or condition of employment.337
Accommodation is never an issue in the religious slur cases. In Turner v.
Barr,338 for example, the employee was subjected to offensive religious
comments. The plaintiff showed a pattern of religiously hostile comments and
activities typified by a tasteless joke about the Holocaust and repeated
comments about Jews and money.339 The accommodation question never
arose. The court treated the claim as though the plaintiff was subject to overt
discrimination and not as though he was asking for an exception to a workplace
rule.
Accommodation also makes little sense when applied to hostile religious
environment claims. The harm in these cases comes from the fear, intimida-
tion, and psychological distress suffered by the plaintiffs. The victim of the
discrimination bears the burden while the perpetrators are allowed to continue
their misconduct. Title VII's goal is to eliminate discrimination in the
workplace. This necessarily requires workplaces that are hostile environments
to change.34 It would be anomalous to allow religiously hostile workplaces to
continue while Title VII eliminates other forms of hostile environments.
IV. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN THE MODERN ERA
In the end, the question is whether or not the elimination of religious
discrimination is as important to the law and society as the elimination of racial
or sexual discrimination. Contemporary culture tends to forget America's
n. 161. The difference may be in the eye of the beholder, however. The religiously devout
worker may be as incapable of working in an atmosphere that he or she regards as objectively
sinful as the disabled worker may be incapable of working without an accommodation.
336. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (ruling
employer must investigate and take appropriate action); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th
Cir. 1983) (finding employer's remedy must be reasonably calculated to end harassment).
337. See Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding
transfer an inadequate remedy for sexual harassment when it "reduces the victim's wages or
other remuneration, increases the disamenities of work, or impairs her prospects for promotion
or makes the victim worse off').
338. 806 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1992).
339. Id. at 1028.
340. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1988).
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history of religious bigotry.34' For example, anti-Jewish and anti-Catholic
sentiment animated political parties 32 and social movements.343 For years many
jobs were off limits to members of these faiths.
Today, we have realigned our religious loyalties as people relate less to
the traditional denominations. Divisions remain but they are created more by
a person's particular moral vision than their denomination. 34 Ecumenical
cooperation and the diffusion of knowledge have broken down many of the
barriers between the major faiths. Instead of clear divisions based on the major
religions,3 45 religious conflict occurs among people divided by different beliefs
about authority, revelation, and individualism. These beliefs take expression
as "polarizing impulses or tendencies.",3' The most likely religious problems
today will involve conflicts between these two camps, even if the combatants
are from the same religion.
On one side are the "progressives" who have made more peace with
modem culture. On the other side are the traditionalists or the "orthodox
' 347
who are not as secure and happy with modem America. They hold different
conclusions about the nature of moral rules, the authority of scripture, and the
role of religion in their life.) They will hold different conclusions on matters
of faith and social policy. They will probably have different opinions about
what their religion allows and what it forbids.
The traditionalist sees religion as a set of objective truths and divinely
ordained rules. When an aspect of the social world conflicts with these truths,
the world must conform to the truth.349 On the other hand, a progressive sees
341. See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN A STRANGE LAND: PATrERNs OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1988). See also U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Clearinghouse
Pub. 80, Religion In the Constitution: A Delicate Balance (Sept. 1983).
342. HIGHAM, supra note 341, at 28; Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 341, at 16
(describing the brief life and death of the "Know-Nothings").
343. JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS 37 (1991); U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra
note 341, at 15-16 (discussing the activities of groups like the American Protective Association
and the Ku Klux Klan, which engaged in anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish activities well into the
twentieth century).
344. HUNTER, supra note 343, at 42-43.
345. We refer to the historically predominant religions in the United States: Protestantism,
Roman Catholicism, and Judaism. See HUNTER, supra note 343, at 39.
346. HUNTER, supra note 343, at 43. It is important to note that most people do not
subscribe without reservation to these moral visions. Rather, they tend to occupy a vast middle
spectrum, perhaps leaning one way or another. Nevertheless, they are influenced by the
articulation of the more extreme visions in public discourse. Id.
347. Orthodox is used to denote an affiliation with traditional religious views. It is not
meant to refer only to those Christians who belong to the various Eastern Orthodox traditions.
HUNTER, supra note 343, at 43-44.
348. HUNTER, supra note 343, at 43-46.
349. Hunter describes the "Orthodox" vision as:
the commitment ... to an external, definable, and transcendent authority. Such
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religion as a process of slowly unfolding revelation that is historically and
culturally conditioned. When a conflict exists between the world and religion,
it is quite possibly the religion that will change. Truth is subject to the on-
going mediation of experience.350
In this environment, it is likely that the traditionalist will object to some
aspect of the environment. The plaintiff who is offended by pornographic
pictures or sexual taunts could be any denomination. The taunts themselves
may not be motivated by denominational bias and may be hurled by members
of the plaintiff's own denomination.351 These employees suffer as much as the
plaintiff who is subjected to overt religious slurs. If we fail to provide them
with an avenue for resolving these disputes, we will trivialize their concerns
and disenfranchise them. We will send a message that their religious beliefs are
unimportant and that the law is not concerned with their well-being. We will
be denying that the beliefs perhaps constituting their very person are not
worthy of consideration in either the workplace or in the courtroom.
Shutting religion out of the workplace is not consistent with our traditional
principles of tolerance and inclusion. Professor Steven Jamar has argued for
a conceptualization of anti-discrimination law that includes these goals among
others. Jamar argues for a Dworkinian accommodation of religion in the
workplace where cases "should not be decided by relatively rigid application
of formulaic rules. Instead, they should be decided through carefully nuanced
consideration of the seemingly imprecise principle of accommodation tempered
by and informed by the principles and ideals of tolerance, equality, neutrality,
and inclusion. 352
Although Jamar's proposal applies to religious secular employers, its
recitation of the relevant principles applies to this discussion of the religious
employee. Religious employees are whipsawed by the demands of the secular
workplace and the demands of their consciences. As Jamar points out, courts
objective and transcendent authority defines, at least in the abstract, a consistent,
unchangeable measure of value, purpose, goodness, and identity, both personal and
collective. It tells us what is good, what is true, how we should live, and who we are.
HUNTER, supra note 343, at 44.
350. Hunter defines the progressive moral vision as:
a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism. Progressivist moral ideals tend, that is, to
derive from and embody [these characteristics.] From this standpoint, truth tends to
be viewed as a process, as a reality that is ever unfolding . [. " (There may be a]
"strong tendency to translate the moral ideals of a religious tradition so that they
conform to and legitimate the contemporary Zeitgeist."
HUNTER, supra note 343, at 44.
351. Cf Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339, 1341 (8th Cir. 1995),
where the court noted that Wilson's supervisors and many of her co-workers were Roman
Catholic like Wilson.
352. Jamar, supra note 29, at 720.
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have found it easy to side with the nonreligious employee against both the
religious employer or employee. 353 Principles like accommodation, toleration,
inclusion," and equality are all ignored when the employee has no option to
choose a religiously compatible workplace or to remedy a religiously hostile
one.
V. RELIGIOUS HARASSMENT AND FREE SPEECH
We have argued that plaintiff's lawyers should raise more religious
harassment claims and courts should be more sensitive to them. We have
suggested that the court's reluctance to allow religious business environments
should lead to a broader application of religious hostile environment principles.
Remedial orders in religious hostile environment cases may be very broad. For
example, in Turner v. Barr, the court's order prevented any and all religiously
offensive jokes. 54 Similarly, in Lambert, the presumptive remedy would be to
prohibit the display of all pictures of naked women.
Commentators have raised significant free speech questions in sexual
harassment cases involving remedies like the ones proposed above.355
353. Jamar, supra note 29, at 720.
354. Turner, 806 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (D.D.C. 1992). Cf. Imperial Diner v. State Human
Rts. Appeal Bd. 417 N.E.2d 525 (N.Y. 1980) (finding single incident sufficient to constitute
religious discrimination).
355. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); see also Marcy Strauss,
Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1990); Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Worlplace Harassment and Upholding the First Amendment - Avoiding a Collision,
37 VILL. L. REV. 757 (1992); Jeffrey A. Steele, Fighting the Devil With A Double-Edged Sword:
Is the Speech Invoked Hostile Work Environment Hostile to O'Brien, 72 U. DET. L. REV. 83
(1994); Wayne L. Robbins, When Two Liberal Values Collide in an Era of 'Political
Correctness' : First Amendment Protection as a Check on Speech-Based Title VII Hostile
Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 789 (1995); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of
Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992). Professor Volokh is most
closely identified with this position. See Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work
Environment" Harassment Law Restrict? 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997); Eugene Volokh, Thinking
Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work Environment Harassment, 17 BERKELEY
J. EMP & LAB. L. 305 (1996) [hereinafter Volokh, Thinking Ahead]; Eugene Volokh, How
Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RuTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995). But see, e.g.,
Deborah Epstein, Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment As Gender-Based Discrimination,
(Mis) Treatment, 85 GEO. L.J. 649 (1997); Mary Becker, How Free is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 815 (1996); Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman " Achieve Equality In
the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Speech, 84 GEo. L.J. 399
(1996); Charles R. Callerus, Title VII and Free Speech: The First Amendment is Not Hostile to
a Content Neutral Hostile Environment Theory, 1996 UTAH L. REV 227 (1996); Suzanne
Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and The First
Amendment: No Collision In Sight, 47 RUTGERs L. REV. 461 (1995); Richard Fallon, Sexual
Harassment Content Neutrality and the First Amendment Dog that Didn 't Bark, 1994 SuP. CT.
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Professor Eugene Volokh argues that none of the broadest anti-harassment
orders can be justified by current First Amendment law or extensions of
existing principles.356 Moreover, the threat of liability squelches even more
speech by encouraging employers to enact "no tolerance" anti-harassment
policies.357 Thus, even if such extensions could be made, it would be bad First
Amendment policy to do so.
Volokh suggests the creation of a new, limited First Amendment category
for workplace harassment. For Volokh, the First Amendment should
distinguish between directed harassment and undirected speech. Directed
harassment is "speech aimed at a particular employee because of her race, sex,
religion, or national origin. '  General speech is undirected, i.e., it is "speech
between other employees that is overheard by the offended employee, or
printed material intended to communicate to the other employees in
general ... ."'9 The Free Speech Clause fully protects undirected speech but
allows prohibition of directed harassment.
Thus, Volokh would (presumably) agree with the outcome in Finnemore,
in which the court found a cause of action for religious harassment' when co-
workers directed sexually explicit remarks at the complainant.3'6 On the other
hand, Volokh would (presumably) disagree with the result in Lambert, in
which the court found a religious harassment claim because of workplace
displays of pornographic pictures.
36
'
REV. 1; Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375; Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervisory Centerfolds and
Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 403 (1991); Peggy E. Bruggnan, Beyond Pinups: Workplace Restrictions on
the Private Consumption of Pornography, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 271 (1995).
356. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1819. Volokh considers and rejects the
arguments that workplace harassment orders can be justified under time, place, and manner,
captive audience, and workplace speech doctrines. Id. at 1820-43.
357. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1809- 1810 (companies fearing liability enact
harsh speech codes and employees fearing discipline avoid controversial topics); Volokh,
Thinking Ahead, supra note 355, at 310 ("[t]o be safe, [an employer] has to prohibit any
individual statement that might contribute to a hostile environment").
358. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1846. See also, Volokh, Thinking Ahead, supra
note 355, at 311 ("1 think one-to-one speech- statements made only to the offended party - can
be restricted .... When the only listener is one who doesn't want to hear, the speech can be
restrained without interfering with the speaker's ability to reach other, willing, listeners").
359. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1846. See also Volokh, Thinking Ahead, supra
note 355, at 311. ("One-to-many communication - posters, newsletters, conversations in the
lunchroom involving willing (or at least potentially willing) listeners - is, in my view, fully
protected by the Free Speech Clause from government imposed restrictions such as those
imposed by workplace harassment law.").
360. See supra notes 293-297 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 313-316 and accompanying text. Unlike some commentators, Volokh
admits that some workplaces can be restricted without violating the First Amendment.
Compare Browne, supra note 355 with Volokh, Comment, supra note 355. Volokh also makes
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A complete discussion of the free speech issue is beyond the scope of this
article. We will briefly address potential First Amendment concerns in
pornography cases for two reasons. First, there is a developing body of law
finding pornographic displays sexual harassment that provides the baseline for
whether or not such displays also constitute religious harassment. Second,
Volokh's free speech arguments seem to break down when considering
religious objections to workplace pornography.
Professor Volokh argues that suppression of pornography as part of a
hostile work environment remedy is necessarily content or viewpoint based.362
Workplace pornography is considered sexual harassment by courts, according
to Volokh, because either (1) it makes men think of women in "the wrong way,
or (2) it sends a message particularly offensive to women., 363 The former
violates the first amendment because it is "thought control in its most literal
sense. Even the strongest of state interests in equality cannot justify suppress-
ing speech because it makes people think women are inferior. '  The latter
violates the First Amendment because it intrudes into political speech--the
core of the first amendment.365 Finally, even if some justification for
suppressing workplace pornography could be posited, drawing an acceptably
narrow order would be nearly impossible. The order would have to distinguish
between pornography and "legitimate art:" a task easier said than done.36 At
the same time, it also would have to distinguish between an employer's interest
clear his distaste for workplace harassment in Freedom of Speech and Woriplace Harassment,
supra note 355 at 1807 -09, where he describes the "harrowing abuse" that occurred in some
cases. Except for these "egregious cases," Volokh does not distinguish between the standards
for Title VII liability and the standards for reviewing remedial orders. Volokh, How
Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, supra note 355, 564 n.4. More precisely, Volokh's
position is that current free speech case law does not support the notion that "the standard for
restricting protected speech differs depending on the presence of past misconduct." Volokh,
How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, supra note 355, at 564, 565. Thus, we assume
that because Lambert appears to be "one-to-many" speech, Volokh would not find the employer
liable for religious harassment. In Finnemore, we assume that because the speech is "one-to-
one," Volokh would find the employer liable if the proper conditions were met. Volokh would
(presumably) be concerned if a court entered an overly broad order. See Volokh, Thinking
Ahead, supra note 355 at 307, in which Volokh refers to Turner v. Barr, in which the court's
order prohibited "any racial, religious, ethnic, or other remarks or slurs contrary to their fellow
employees' religious beliefs."
362. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1858-59.
363. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1858-59.
364. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1858.
365. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1859.
366. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1859-60. Volokh states that the Robinson
court's order would have prevented an employee from "putting a calender of Renaissance nudes
on his wall, or a suggestive picture of his wife on his desk (even if the picture involves no
nudity)." Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1860. See also Volokh, Thinking Ahead, supra
note 355, at 309.
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in using or selling non-obscene pornographic materials and "impermissible"
hostile environments.367 Volokh does not find harassment law up to the task.
Religious objections to workplace pornography do not track with
Volokh's first amendment analysis. We believe that religious concerns are
sufficiently important to allow orders banning the general display of pornogra-
phy in the appropriate case.368 Moreover, we believe that current harassment
law and current free exercise law provide limiting principles that will help
prevent the evisceration of more general free speech principles.
369
First of all, the complaint in Lambert is not based on either thought
control or the message of pornography. A religious employee may see'the
pornography as an occasion of sin, his sin. Continued exposure to this
information offers the employee a constant temptation to violate religious
commands. The employee does not have readily available technical means to
prevent exposure to the offending materials nor is the exposure fleeting.37°
Instead, he must, day after day, report to an offensive and sinful environment.
In this sense, his complaint is not about the effect pornography may have on
others; it is about the effect that it is having on him.
Second, the directed-undirected distinction collapses when the employee
complains but the material remains visible. Volokh argues that the reason
directed speech can be prohibited is because any prohibition only "prevent[s]
people from communicating their opinions to coworkers who do not want to
listen., 371 Although the opportunity to persuade someone to accept the
speaker's point of view is an important First Amendment value, little is gained
by insulting an unwilling listener. Nevertheless, insults themselves may have
First Amendment value in an open forum but, as Volokh points out, "[t]he
workplace is different; freedom from insult in the workplace is more important
to an employee's ability to earn a living than freedom from insult on the
street.
372
367. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1861 (female employees in an adult book store
cannot complain that the materials create a hostile environment). Cf Sports and Health Club,
370 N.W.2d at 844 (1985) (Peterson, J., dissenting).
368. This is not to say that religious concerns are more important, either Constitutionally
or socially, than racial or sexual concerns in similar cases. We take no position on that issue
because a full exposition is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, we seek to respond to
Volokh's suggestion that proponents of speech-restrictive remedies show "[w]hy this speech
deserves to be unprotected but why at the same time the Free Speech Clause should continue
to protect other sorts of speech." Volokh, Thinking Ahead, supra note 355, at 313.
369. Volokh calls for a "discernible [and] defensible boundar[y]." Volokh, Thinking
Ahead, supra note 355, at 313.
370. See, e.g., Sable Communications Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1992); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
371. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1863.
372. Volokh, Comment, supra note 355, at 1863.
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When an employee complains that pornographic material offends his or
her religious beliefs, the employee is making a general request: help me avoid
sin by removing material from those areas within my view. The religious
employee is saying that he or she does not intend to view the material and does
not intend to be persuaded that it is acceptable. For the worker who views
daily life as sacramental, the very presence of the pictures is almost sacrile-
gious. It demeans the place where God is made manifest.
3 73
Under these circumstances, refusing to remove the material is the
equivalent of a direct insult. Continued display of the material has little
purpose at this point except to offend the complaining employee. If an
employee complains to his co-workers to no avail, and to his employer to no
avail, the continuing display of the offensive materials is no longer intended to
communicate to workers in general. It is now aimed at the "squeamishness"
of the complaining employee.
In Finnemore, the complainant first asked his co-workers to refrain from
their vulgar conversations in his presence. Instead of complying, they began
to include comments about Finnemore's wife. In the same fashion, continued
display of pornographic material after a religiously motivated complaint
changes the nature of the communication. It communicates the same message
that the directed taunts in Finnemore carried. It is not a matter of mere
discomfort; for the religious person it could very well be a matter of spiritual
life and death. Here, as Volokh suggests, the workplace makes a difference.
The loss of income and acceptable employment outweighs the slight harm to
the expressive interests of co-workers.
One must remember that the proper remedy in a pornography case is to
prohibit the display of pornography to unwilling recipients. We believe this
requires a more contextual analysis for each remedy. 374 The Supreme Court
has suggested some general standards.375 We believe that these must be
373. See MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION
(1959) (all life can be sanctified). For a general discussion of this theology from a Roman
Catholic perspective, see BERNARD COOKE, SACRAMENTS & SPIRITUALITY (1989) and ROGER
HAIGHT, THE EXPERIENCE AND LANGUAGE OF GRACE 119- 160 (1979) (discussing theologian
Karl Rahner and also Liberation Theology). See also THOMAS O'MEARA, THE THEOLOGY OF
MINISTRY 159 (1983) (discussing the circumstances under which ordinary work may be
considered ministry). But see HARVEY Cox, THE SECULAR CITY (1965) (theologian author
argues in favor of the "dereligionization" of the workplace and that its increasing secularization
opens new opportunities). For a discussion of the workplace from the perspective of Creation
Theology see MATTHEW Fox, THE REINVENTION OF WORK (1994).
374. Cf Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (totality of the circumstances test required for hostile
environment cases based on sex). Cf. Nadine Strossen, The Tensions Between Regulating
Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment.- No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701 (1995)
(consider full context without unduly emphasizing one factor).
375. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Factors to consider may include "the frequency of the
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contextualized to take into account the workplace itself: e.g., how big is the
work area? Are the employees free to move around or are they fixed in one
location all day? Do employees have personal, private areas, or do they all
share a common lunchroom? In short, the remedy should be limited to the
scope of the violation. a76 Moreover, there should be no prohibition on purely
private possession and display.377 Thus, an employee who wanted to post
pictures on the inside of his private locker should be able to do so. If other
employees complain, a sensitive accommodation of their complaints could
include moving to a different locker, presumably making space for compatible
"speakers" to have lockers nearby. The religious employee can control the
occasion for sin by this action, but this is not true when the material is
pervasively available on bulletin boards, shared work spaces, or newsletters.
There are also strong policy reasons to support the claim that religious
objections to pornography outweigh Free Speech Clause objections. First,
religious liberty has a constitutional pedigree.378 The exact intent of the Framers
is controverted. 37 9 Nevertheless, whatever their exact intentions, the religion
clauses protect "religious liberty.', 380  The Framers feared that a religious
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance." In the kinds of religious harassment cases under discussion here, the ultimate
question may be whether workplace pornography "unreasonably" interferes with job
performance. The answer will depend on a sensitive inquiry into the actual workplace.
376. See, e.g., Domhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1987)
(remedies must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (school desegregation remedy limited to the
scope of the constitutional violation).
377. Cf Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dept., 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (finding
harassment policy invalid as applied to private possession reading a consensual sharing of
sexually oriented magazines). But see Bruggman, supra note 355, arguing that even private
possession should be barred because of the harm caused by pornography).
378. For the history of the Religion Clauses see generally ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1988); DANIEL L.
DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1987); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. Rev. 1994); LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (rev. ed.
1967).
379. Historians have been engaged in small arms fire for years. Compare CORD, supra note
378, at 15 (Framers intended to prohibit the establishment of a national religion and safeguard
freedom of conscience) with LEVY, supra note 378, at Ill (Framers intended to deprive
Congress of all power to legislate on the subject of religion). See generally THOMAS J. CURRY,
THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1986). Although James Madison is invoked by both parties in this debate, his
motivations and importance are also matters of debate. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-
STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 88 (1987) (Madison introduced Bill of Rights for his
political survival) and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 39 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (Madison's thoughts "essential" to understanding First Amendment).
380. JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 11 (1995) ("core value" of religion
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"establishment" would stifle religious life and, at the same time, lead to official
tyranny.3"' They wanted to create a wide path for religious practice and belief.
Thus, the Establishment Clause prohibited government involvement in the
institutional church and vice versa while the Free Exercise Clause preserved
individual religious practice.
Second, religion is an aspect of self-expression. Religious adherents may
see the world in a different way and feel compelled to act on that different
view.38 2 This may lead religious employees to complain about practices they
used to tolerate or to become more assertive in sharing their "good news" with
fellow employees. More than simply putting ideas in the marketplace of ideas,
this new behavior for the religious employee may mirror a spiritual reality that
finds expression in the workplace.3 3
Third, religion is constitutive of a person's identity. Religion and
religious practices form a part of the personal identity of an individual. 38, They
help define how that person relates to others, to the world, to the community,
and to themselves. 38 5 They orient the person morally, socially, and perhaps
politically.386 A religious identity is fundamental and radical; it roots a person
in a reality that is both immanent and transcendent. 387 Thus, it is important to
clauses is religious liberty: "the freedom to pursue (or not to choose) a religious faith").
381. See LEVY, supra note 378, at 105 (First Amendment intended to limit congressional
power) and CORD, supra note 378, at 8 (Framers wanted to protect freedom of conscience).
382. See, Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d at 353 (employer felt a duty to
evangelize); Daniel 0. Conkle, Does the United States Need An Establishment Clause, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 344 (1992).
383. A complete discussion of the theology that underlies this point is beyond the scope of
this article. Although a number of modem theologians are associated with this position, this
article has been most influenced by Karl Rahner and Karl Barth. For a discussion of Barthian
theology in the context of the law, see MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993).
384. Gedicks, supra note 281, at 427-432 (religious belief is holistic and compelling).
385. Conkle, supra note 382, at 344 ("Religion speaks the truth, both inwardly and
outwardly. It tells believers who they are and where they stand.").
386. JAMEs D. HUNTER points out that a moral vision concerns the:
fundamental assumptions that guide our perceptions of the world. These
assumptions provide answers to questions about the nature of reality .... They are
also the assumptions that define the foundations of knowledge. . . . These
assumptions act as a lens that highlights certain aspects of experience as important
or unimportant, relevant or irrelevant, good or bad, and right and wrong. These
unspoken assumptions are the basic standards by which we make moral judgments
and decisions.
HUNTER, supra note 343, at 119. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?
WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
387. See, e.g., MILNER S. BALL, supra note 383, at 98; HAIGHT, supra note 373, at 128;
Stanley Hauerwas and Michael Baxter, The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of Belief is not
Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 107 (1992).
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accommodate religious beliefs because to fail to do so attacks an individual's
core identity. 8
Therefore, religious objections to workplace pornography might be
justifiable in the face of free speech challenges. In short, remedying a religious
objection to workplace pornography is viewpoint neutral. Moreover, continued
display of pornography is the equivalent of a direct attack on the employee.
Finally, there are strong policy reasons that support the extension of harassment
law to these cases: (1) religious freedom is an original constitutional value; (2)
religious practice and belief are aspects of self-expression; and (3) religion is
constitutive of a person's core identity.
There remains another significant problem, however. If, as we have
argued, courts are suspicious of religion, then why should we trust them to
make "correct" decisions on matters of sacred importance? After all, the same
court system that decided Lambert also decided Wilson. This suspicion led to
the downfall of the EEOC's proposed harassment guidelines in 1993.389 The
EEOC proposed a unified set of harassment guidelines. The Commission
issued the guidelines to "emphasize that harassment on any of the bases
covered by the Federal anti-discrimination statutes is unlawful." The
guidelines simply purported to apply the extant body of sexual and racial
harassment law to the other protected statuses, including religion.390 The
guidelines defined harassment as:
[V]erbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility, or aversion
toward an individual because of his/her... religion... or that of his/her
relatives, friends, or associates, and that: (i) has the purpose or effect of
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment; (ii) has the
purpose of effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance; or (iii) otherwise adversely affects an individual's employ-
ment opportunities. (2) Harassing conduct includes but is not limited to, the
following: (i) epithets, slurs, negative stereotyping, or threatening,
intimidating, or hostile acts, that relate to... religion .... and (ii) written
or graphic material that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward an
individual or group because of ... religion and that is placed on walls,
bulletin boards, or elsewhere on the employer's premises, or circulated in
the workplace.39'
388. Gedicks, supra note 281, at 430 ("A religious believer's inability to live her life
consistent with her ultimate concern - her deepest and most compelling reality - puts in question
the meaning of her life, and undermines her very existence.").
389. EEOC Proposed Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender,
National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (Oct. 1, 1993).
390. Id. at 51,266-67.
391. Id. at 51,269.
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Although the guidelines purported to restate existing law, many people
feared that they were an expansion of the law that would threaten religious
liberty. Religious advocates swamped the EEOC with over 100,000 com-
ments, more than the EEOC had ever received.392 Commentators criticized
almost every aspect of the guidelines.393 Underlying their complaints, however,
was the fear that the guidelines would be used to squelch religious expression
in the workplace.394 Eventually, Congress got involved and forced the EEOC
to withdraw the guidelines.395
The guideline's demise did not change the current state of the law,
however. The lessons learned from that debacle are instructive. It is important
to both protect religious expression and prevent religious harassment. Courts
cannot look for categorical rules that will establish whether harassment has
occurred.396 Rather the law must take into account a wider range of factors in
order to determine if the harassment has occurred and, if so, whether it was
serious enough to be actionable.
One commentator, Betty L. Dunkum, drawing on the criticisms of the
proposed guidelines, has proposed a set of factors for the EEOC to consider
when redrawing the guidelines. These factors are useful for courts to consider
as well.397 Dunkum proposes that "[p]assive religious speech in and of itself'
should not create a hostile work environment.398 Instead, she recommends a
multi-factored approach.399 Such an approach, while not infallible, should
392. See Jay W. Waks & Christopher R. Brewster, Proposed EEOC Guidelines on
"Religious Harassment" Provoked a Firestorm of Criticism, Causing the Agency to Pull Back
for Now, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at B5.
393. Betty L. Dunkum, Where to Draw the Line: Handling Religious Harassment Issues
in the Wake of the Failed EEOC Guidelines, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 953 (1996); Gregory,
supra note 23; Lora N. Reed, Student Article, Is the EEOC Out of Line? Proposed Guidelines
on Religious Harassment, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS & POL'Y 203 (1995).
394. But see Dworkin and Pierce, supra note 23 (criticizing proposed guidelines for
allowing too much religious expression).
395. In June 1994, the Senate unanimously approved a resolution that urged the EEOC to
remove religion from the proposed guidelines. Dunkum, supra note 393, at 956. Subsequently,
both the House and the Senate passed measures that would have required the EEOC to withdraw
the guidelines. Dunkum, supra note 393, at 956. Finally, Congress appropriated significantly
less for the agency than had been requested, apparently in retaliation for the proposed
guidelines. Dunkham, supra note 393, at 956-957. In September, the EEOC commissioners
unanimously agreed to withdraw the guidelines. Dunkham, supra note 393, at 957.
396. There may be a brighter line about religious symbols, however. Courts should be
certain to avoid imposing liability simply because another employee wears a religious symbol.
The guidelines did not address this issue and their silence may have been the single most
important factor leading to their downfall.
397. Dunkum, supra note 393, at 987-988.
398. Dunkum, supra note 393, at 988. Passive religious speech includes religious displays
and jewelry as well as religious based conversations. Dunkum, supra note 393, at 987.
399. Dunkum, supra note 393, at 988. The factors Dunkum suggests taking into account
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allow courts to more effectively address the concerns of both religious
employees and their employers.
In the end, the question may come down to whether one is a realist or a
formalist as to free speech questions. As Professor Volokh points out, these two
approaches to first amendment questions come with "excellent credentials and
many learned followers." '4 0 One can either prefer a balancing test that takes
into account the multiple factors and interests present in each case or one can
prefer formal, categorical rules. 40' Because the composition and ideology of
courts change, formalism, for Volokh, helps "cabin judicial discretion. ' '40 2 But
one need not go to either extreme. Our approach, which requires courts to
consider a variety of factors, takes into account the reality of the modern
workplace. The factors are objective enough to cabin most judges but flexible
enough to give discretion. Given that courts will be deciding these claims, we
prefer an approach that more fully attempts to balance equality and liberty,
speech and religion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hostile environment law presents a viable way to attack religious
discrimination in the workplace. By examining cases involving claims of
harassment and religious employees, we have endeavored to determine how the
courts are handling these claims and how their approach to them can be
improved from the perspective of both the employer and the employee. As
currently applied by the courts, this area of the law has not provided adequate
protection to religious employees. The involvement of First Amendment, Free
Exercise, and Establishment Clauses in these claims has further perplexed the
courts, resulting in anomalous decisions that lessen the right to work in a non-
discriminatory atmosphere for members of minority religions. Indeed, the
include:
[R]eligious speech that rises to the level of epithets, taunts, or slurs. Such speech
can be directed toward a person, regarding the religion of his/her friends, relatives,
or associates; conduct that is physically threatening or humiliating; speech or
conduct that causes psychological harm; religious speech that creates an implicit
quid pro quo; the suppression of different religious views; compelled participation
in religious or anti-religious activity; a request by an employee that posters, artwork,
or slogans with religious overtones be removed from public spaces in the workplace
that is not honored. (Posters, calendars, artwork and slogans can be kept on
personal bulletin boards, in personal offices); [and] continued sharing or invitations
to an employee who has made clear he/she does not want to continue conversations
or participate in an activity.
400. Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, supra note 355, at 575
401. Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, supra note 355, at 575-76.
402. Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, supra note 355, at 576.
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courts seem unable to handle these claims adequately and frequently misapply
standards in a manner that confounds the purposes of Title VII.
After looking at and evaluating harassment claims in a variety of
circumstances, we suggest a not so novel resolution of the problems encoun-
tered by the courts deciding these cases. An application of a true totality of the
circumstances standard, including a welcomeness determination when
appropriate, to religious harassment claims should resolve many of the
problems encountered by the courts in this area. While this is the current
standard applicable to harassment law generally, the courts have been careless
in applying this standard to religion claims. The courts must analyze these
claims in a more rigorous manner. Often they side with the nonreligious
employer or employee in a context in which it is unclear how they are applying
the standards for determining religious discrimination or harassment. The
courts need to look closely at whose rights are at issue and how the alleged
wrongful conduct interferes with religious practices or discriminates based on
religion. Coupling this close look with more sensitivity for the rights of
employees who have strict or minority religious beliefs should result in cases
being decided in a manner that gives due regard to both the religious employee
as well as employers and co-workers. Several developments occurred while
this article was going to press.
403
403. On July 31, 1997, Senators Coats and Kerry introduced the "Workplace Religious
Freedom Act of 1997." (S. 1124). The bill would amend Title VII's definition of "undue
hardship" and more precisely define when an employer has failed to make a reasonable
accommodation.
On August 14, 1997, President Clinton issued "Guidelines on Religious Exercise and
Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace." (1997 WL 475412 White House) These
guidelines establish that federal agencies "shall not discriminate against employees on the basis
of religion, require religious participation or non-participation as a condition of employment,
or permit religious harassment." They provide examples of prohibited and permitted conduct,
drawn largely from the cases discussed in this article. The guidelines also model the definition
of religious harassment on sexual and racial harassment. The guidelines prohibit "a hostile
environment, or religious harassment, in the form of religiously discriminatory intimidation,
or pervasive or severe religious ridicule or insult." They counsel a "totality of the
circumstances" approach. In addition, they specifically prohibit harassment directed at an
employee because of that employee's religious beliefs and, as an example, use the facts from
Finnemore v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 645 A.2d 15 (Maine 1994).
On August 19, 1997, the Seventh Circuit handed down a decision in Venters v. City of
Delphi, _ F. 3d _, 1997 WL 471341 (7th Cir. 1997). The court held that an employee can
make out a prima facie case of religiously motivated discharge and workplace harassment
without first requesting an accommodation for her religious beliefs, as suggested in this article.
An employee need only show that "her perceived religious shortcomings played a motivating
role in her discharge." In addition, the court noted that religious harassment fits within the
conventional framework for analyzing other harassment claims under Title VII. The court went
on the adopt the Harris totality of the circumstances test. Although the case involved a religious
supervisor, the court's analytical approach generally followed the approach suggested in this
article.
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